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INTRODUCTION: THE DILEMMA OF PARTICIPATION IN 
DEVELOPMENT 
The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one 
is against it in principle because it is good for you.1 
Since the advent of federally-sponsored urban develop-
ment, the federal government has sought to facilitate decen-
tralized decision-making by local governments.2 While the geo-
graphical proximity oflocal government makes it best suited to 
determine the types of local development activities and the 
manner of execution of such local projects, federal programs 
have nevertheless strongly encouraged local governments to 
include community participation in the development decision-
making process.3 AB a result, the federal push for decentraliza-
tion has involved both a release of power and a limited com-
mand: a devolution of development decision-making power to 
local governments with a requirement to involve local 
citizens-residents and proponents of inner-city neighborhoods 
that are typically poor and, more often than not, black. 
Participation evokes notions of democracy, egalitarianism, 
and inclusion and, as the introductory quotation illustrates, it 
is easy to support in principle. Any citizen is theoretically 
eligible to share his or her views about the shape, pace, and 
location of a development project through a variety of partici-
patory methods, such as public meetings, focus groups, adviso-
1 Sherry Arnstein, Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation, in 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: A CASEBOOK IN DEMOCRACY 335, 337 (Edgar S. Cahn & 
Barry A. Passett eds., 1970). 
2 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949). 
3 The antecedents for federally encouraged citizen participation extend back to 
when Congress chartered chambers of commerce in 1912 to learn about the views 
of the business community. In the 1930s, the Department of Agriculture developed 
locally elected county and community committees of farmers to create a more 
direct relationship between the federal government and farmers and allow the De-
partment to adapt federal grants-in-aid to local needs. See United States Advisory 
Commission on IntergoveI'I)IIlental Relations, Citizen Participation in the American 
Federal System 110 (1979); see also Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, § 
105(d), 63 Stat. 413, 417 (requiring citizen participation through public hearings); 
Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 560, § 221(a)(1), 68 Stat. 590, 600 (1954) (mak-
ing citizen participation a mandated element of the "workable program for commu-
nity improvement" for those communities or localities that requeste.d provision of 
mortgage insurance). 
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ry committees, or community charrettes. But participation is 
often less easy to support in practice because of its structural 
disconnect with urban development. Participation relies on 
contrastingly radical precepts of direct democracy-the views 
of a collection of non-professional, non-expert, and potentially 
disruptive citizens are to be included in a legally technical and 
logistically complicated development process that usually de-
pends heavily on training and expertise. Moreover, precepts of 
community participation dictate that people who are of differ-
ent class, race, education, status, and socioeconomic back-
grounds shall work together in an open decision-making pro-
, cess. People who are interested in a neighborhood for the profit 
to be made are supposed to work together with people who are 
only concerned about the quality of life in the neighborhood. At 
a minimum, a participatory development process envisioned as 
collaborative, synergistic, and inclusive can also potentially 
mean delay, disruption, and perceptions of wasted time. 
This disconnect between principle and practice has been 
reflected over time and over the variety of federal urban devel-
opment initiatives to revitalize inner cities that have mandated 
community participation.4 The types of participatory mecha-
nisms have varied, however, in an ebb and flow of contrast-
ingly strong and weak mandates for participation. This ebb 
and flow of federally-mandated participation is particularly 
striking because neither strong nor weak provisions have re-
sulted in participation that has been uniformly satisfactory to 
individual citizens, communities, or local governments. At least 
one, some, or all are dissatisfied. The failures are often attrib-
uted to problems with inadequate funding or implementation 
or an impolitic violation of political federalism by inappropri-
ately attempting to closely manage local participatory process-
es at the federallevel.5 This Article argues that the problem is 
not implementational or lack of federal respect for local con-
trol. Rather, the problem is at once rhetorical, normative, and 
structural. 
• For instance, Urban Renewal, Community Action, Demonstration Cities, 
Community Development Block Grant, and Empowerment Zones. See supra Part 1. 
5 See, e.g., Barlow Burke, Jr., The Threat to Citizen Participation in Model 
Cities, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 751, 775 (1971) (attributing the failures of citizen 
participation in the Model Cities Program to lack of vision and direction of federal 
government's bureaucratically complex management of the program). 
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Part I of this Article describes the ebb and flow of federal 
participatory mandates between strong and weak mandates for 
participation, all of which have been dissatisfying or unproduc-
tive. Part II picks up where federal mandates have left off by 
examining the three dominant sets of justifications for partici-
pation in the context of the elite-dominated and privatized 
process of urban development. Part II then considers the ex-
tent to which each type of explanation convincingly justifies 
the often time-consuming processes and conflict inherent in 
community participation. The justifications, which I character-
ize as instrumental, democratic, and empowerment, make 
broad claims about the benefits and purposes of participation. 
This Article argues, however, that the familiar instrumental or 
efficiency-based justifications for participation, as well as dem-
ocratic or process-based justifications, are inadequate, standing 
alone, to justify or explain the importance of community partic-
ipation in development. Instead, empowerment theories that 
explicitly connect participation to a redistribution of decision-
making power are an important yet overlooked aspect of the 
basis for community participation in development. These theo-
ries recognize that given the exclusive and privatized nature of 
the development decision-making process, including represen-
tatives of poor urban communities (communities that have 
been racialized black and classified poor) entails an act of 
resistance to the nature of economic development that is cur-
rently directed exclusively towards meeting the interests of the 
middle class and the wealthy. I then argue for a way to recon-
cile the three theories to provide the best justification for par-
ticipation, as well as to discuss the substantive choices that 
must be made to make participatory mandates meaningful. 
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The road to economic opportunity and community development 
starts with broad participation by all segments of the communi-
ty .... Communities that stand together are communities that can 
rise together.6 
I. THE EBB AND FLOW OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE 
LOCAL COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
The above-quoted statement seems an inspiring indication 
of the federal government's commitment to the right of par-
ticipation for poor community residents in urban economic 
development. Or is it? On closer examination, what exactly 
does the statement mean? Notions of decentralized decision-
making, local control, and community involvement come to 
mind. In some ways the federal government is demonstrating 
great deference and respect for local geographies while also 
attempting to reconfigure the boundaries of inclusion and ex-
clusion in development at the local level. But crucial questions 
remain unanswered: How broad should broad participation be? 
To what end? On what decisions? Why should all segments of 
the community be involved in a complicated, technical, largely 
legal and financial process that is usually handled by business 
and government elites?7 How does collective community action 
lead to improved economic opportunity? For whom? Where did 
this idea come from? 
Participation has to be understood within the context of 
the history of urban development programs in the United 
States. Urban development has been an ongoing local govern-
mental project of creating a functioning and productive city by 
planning, financing, and developing a variety of commercial 
and residential facilities, amenities, and uses of land. Begin-
ning in the late 19308 and 1940s, the emphasis was on the 
6 U.S. DEP'T OF HOus. AND URBAN DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES: TOGETHER. 
APPLICATION FORMS FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES 4 
(1994). 
1 See Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space and Place: The Geography of Eco-
nomic Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 351 (1999) ("The current geogra-
phy of economic development is one in which economic development is designed 
and intended to be carried out in particular ways in particular places: privately 
and exclusively in central business districts on the other side of the line demarcat-
ing the difference between the inner city and the rest of the city."). 
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elimination of slums in cities to improve quality of life for 
those residents while also promoting the overall economic 
health of the city by making it an attractive place for middle-
class residents.8 Today, the articulated rationale for redevelop-
ment is more directly and explicitly economic development.9 
That rationale is consistent, however, with what urban devel-
opment always has been and meant in the United States. In 
either case, the goal is the same: to facilitate the social and 
economic well-being of urban citizens. 
While the federal government has sought to encourage the 
private sector actors to take the lead in initiating and planning 
development,10 federal legislation has also endeavored since 
at least the 1950s to get cities to include affected residents in 
the process of development decision-making.ll In some ways 
this is a reflection of the impact of the Administrative Proce-
dures Act/2 through which the federal government attempted 
to make federal rule-making accessible to citizens who care to 
have a role in shaping the outcome of implementing regula-
tions. Continuing in that tradition, programs as diverse as 
urban renewal, housing development, and transportation fund-
ing have included citizen or community participation re-
quirements to ensure that the process of project identification, 
programmatic priorities, and implementation allows for some 
democratic participation by ordinary citizens.13 Therefore, the 
8 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, tit. I, 63 Stat. 413, 414-21. 
9 See, e.g., Louise A Howells, Looking for the Butterfly Effect: An Analysis of 
Urban Economic Development under the Community Development Block Grant Pro· 
gram, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 383, 390 (1997) (critiquing CDBG's effective-
ness as an economic development program). 
10 In comparison, European approaches have been more centralized and state 
directed. Increasingly, however, England has attempted more privatized approaches 
to what they term "urban regeneration." Susan Fainstein, Urban Development, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING 614, 615 (Willem van Vliet ed., 1998). 
II See Burke, supra note 5, at 751-55 (discussing the history of citizen partici-
pation in federal programs since the 1930s). 
12 These administrative processes began with public hearing requirements and 
evolved into comment procedures. The rules governing these processes are detailed, 
numerous, and cumbersome. At the federal level, they have been criticized for 
mandating rule-making processes that are monopolized by professional interest 
groups (which are typically the only ones with the sustained interest and resourc-
es to keep track of detailed and often tedious rule making sessions) rather than 
involving ordinary citizens. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of 
Mass Participation, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 175 n.5 (1997). 
13 Citizen participation requirements are also contained in many other block 
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proliferation of participation as an accepted aspect of local 
planning and decision-making is due largely to the federal 
government. Today, the inclusion of participatory mechanisms 
in local decision-making is an accepted cornerstone practice in 
the field of land use planning and development and environ-
mental management.14 The potential benefit is the extent to 
which such participatQry procedures encourage localities to 
take into account the interests of groups that are typically ex-
cluded from political or planning processes. While there are 
many success stories, the record of the grand federal initiatives 
for participation in development has been, at best, mixed.I5 
A. Modern Participation and the Rubber Stamp 
The first experience with massive urban redevelopment in 
the United States arose out of the Housing Act of 1949's (the 
"1949 Act") Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal program. IS 
This program provided funding for cities on a per project basis 
for locally generated plans for demolishing slums and renovat-
grant programs. Participation requirements mandated in the Local Crime Preven-
tion Block Grant Program passed as part of the Safe Streets Act of 1994, 42 
U.S.C. § 13756 (2000). See RAYMOND SHAPEK, MANAGING FEDERALISM: THE EvOLU-
TION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM 190-201 (1981). A number 
of other categorical programs require public participation in the policy formulation 
process. See, e.g., The Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 128 (2000); The Elemen-
tary and Secondary School Act, 20 U.S.C. § 6319 (a)(1) (2000). Both Acts require 
public participation in the state spending of federal grant monies. The goal is 
often to get local governments to plan regionally with other areas whose interests 
might be affected by the grants. 
14 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (2000). A few cities are even beginning to include 
community participation components in their zoning practices and even legislation. 
See, e.g., City of Glendale, Arizona, Citizen Participation Ordinance (requiring per-
sons requesting a zoning change that requires a public hearing to first prepare 
and implement a citizen participation plan that must involve informing and pro-
viding an opportunity to discuss the proposed changes in advance of the public 
hearing). See generally Margaret A. Moote et al., Theory in Practice: Applying Par-
ticipatory Democracy Theory to Public Land Planning, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 877 (pre-
senting a case study of Bureau of Land Management utilization of a more partic-
ipatory method of public land use management). 
15 In one sense, it might be accurate to use the word disappointing instead of 
mixed. But there have been indirect benefits from past participatory experiences 
apart from whether or not the participatory mechanism worked in a particular 
federal program. See infra note 39 (discussing the role that the Great Society pro-
grams played in providing employment as well as urban political power in North-
ern cities during the late 1960s and early 1970s). 
16 Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949). 
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ing blighted areas "to improve the urban environment, to keep 
middle class residents and reduce the flight of high income 
taxpayers to the suburbs."17 The approach was to facilitate 
such redevelopment by removing certain market and property 
ownership obstacles to updated uses of urban land. IS The typi-
cal urban renewal program involved designating an area as 
blighted, preparing a development plan, holding a public hear-
ing, exercising the power of eminent domain (typically by a 
redevelopment authority) to assemble parcels ofland for devel-
opment, physically clearing and bulldozing the land, and mar-
keting the cleared land to potential developers.19 Urban re-
newal is less remembered for its claimed successes than for its 
conspicuous failures. The fundamental flaw of urban renewal 
was that it incorrectly assumed that private redevelopment 
would occur if land that had been declared blighted was 
cleared and made available for development.2o This flawed 
assumption had a devastatingly and irreparable impact: the 
designation of blighted areas destroyed many stable neighbor-
hoods and displaced the low-income residents who were, more 
often than not, black.21 Relocation assistance was minimal for 
property owners and nonexistent for renters. Residents were 
displaced into other neighborhoods that then became over-
17 MANuEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 102 (1983). Herbert 
Gans, writing at the time, observed that urban renewal "cleared slums to make 
room for many luxury-housing and a few middle-income projects, and . . . also 
provided inexpensive land for the expansion of colleges, hospitals, libraries, [and] 
shopping areas." Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 539 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1966). 
18 C. Theodore Koebel, Center for Hous. Research, Va. Polytechnic Inst. and 
State Univ., Urban Redevelopment, Displacement, and the Future of the American 
City 7-8 (1996). 
19 See Martin A Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, in URBAN RENEWAL: THE 
RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 17, at 492-93. See generally MARTIN 
ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 
1949-1962 (1964). 
20 One problem, for example, was that the cleared land might be undesirable 
for development because it was still surrounded by slums. Gans, supra note 17, at 
542. 
21 Gans, supra note 17, at 538-39. According to Anderson, two-thirds were 
Black or Puerto Rican. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 65; see also Charles F. Casey-
Leininger, Making the Second Ghetto in Cincinnati: Avondale, 1925-70, in RACE 
AND THE CITY: WORK, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST IN CINCINNATI, 1820-1970, at 232, 
242 (Henry Louis Taylor, Jr. ed., 1993) (describing how urban renewal was used 
in support of deliberate policies to racially segregate neighborhoods). 
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crowded and also deteriorated.22 Declaring a neighborhood 
blighted was also a self-fulfilling prophecy-it hastened deteri-
oration by removing any incentive that property owners, who 
knew their property was going to be acquired, had to maintain 
the property.23 
The Housing Act of 195424 (the "1954 Act") amended the 
1949 Act to add rehabilitation as a goal in addition to develop-
ment. The 1954 Act contained a modest community participa-
tion requirement: each city was supposed to COPle up with a 
"workable program" for urban renewal.25 Citizen boards were 
convened but were often hastily assembled advisory commit-
tees that had a token representative of the communities (most-
ly poor, mostly black) on the board.26 This representative most 
often simply provided a "rubber stamp," legitimating urban 
redevelopment decisions that had already been made by the 
local government. Therefore, very little meaningful participa-
tion in important redevelopment decisions by either ordinary 
citizens or residents of the affected neighborhoods took 
place.27 Participation with little meaning had an unintended 
consequence, however. While urban renewal is widely under-
22 Gans, supra note 17, at 539. 
23 Koebel, supra note 18, at 8-9. 
2' Housing Act of 1954, Rehabilitation & Neighborhood Conservation Housing 
Insurance provisions, Pub. L. No. 560, ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590, 596-603 (1954) 
(amending the 1949 Act to provide incentives for rehabilitation as well as demoli-
tion). • 
25 The guidelines consisted of a pamphlet concerned that the form and extent 
of citizen participation would vary from locality to locality. The guidelines recom-
mended, among other things, that cities use a citizen's advisory committee "con_ 
sisting of prominent citizens appointed by the mayor." U.S. Housing and Home 
Finance Agency, How Localities Can Develop a Workable Program for Urban Re· 
newal 10-11 (Mar. 1955). The guidelines further advised, "Opportunity to partici-
pate should be available to all neighborhood interests so that there is full under-
standing of the program by occupants of the affected city blocks. Those affected by 
the program should have an opportunity not only to be informed but to express 
their views, fears, or apprehensions." ld.; see also Charles F. Casey-Leininger, 
Planning Community Control and the Persistent Ghetto in Cincinnati, 1956-1980 
(1995) (unpublished), at http://comm-org.utoledo.edulpapers96/casey-Ieininger.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (discussing Cincinnati's "workable program" as a pro-
cess of seeking meritorious suggestions). 
26 See generally Arthur R. Simon, New Yorkers Without a Voice: A Tragedy of 
Urban Renewal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Apr. 1966) (providing firsthand account of the 
ineffective attempts by poor residents to participate in and impact the outcome of 
a New York City urban renewal program). 
27 ld. 
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stood to be a program originally designed to help restore cities 
that contributed instead to their decline,28 urban renewal is 
ironically noteworthy for another contribution. Urban renewal 
may have been partially responsible for galvanizing local com-
munities and policymakers to understand the importance of 
including meaningful measures for citizen participation in 
future urban development programs.29 
B. Power to the People: Community Participation "Back in the 
Day" 
During the 1960s, the federal government declared a "War 
on Poverty" and adopted a number of social service and devel-
opment programs containing relatively strong participatory 
requirements to address the problems of black poverty in 
northern city ghettos.3o The inspiration for a strong partic-
ipatory mandate in federal War on Poverty (also coined "the 
Great Society") programs stemmed from a privately funded, 
precursor program, the Gray Areas program. This program 
28 Koebel, supra note 18, at 9. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER 
BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1974). 
29 See Susan S. Fainstein & Clifford Hirst, Neighborhood Organizations and 
Community Planning: The Case and Context of the Minneapolis Experience, in 
REVITALIZING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 96-111 CW. Dennis Keating et al. eds., 1996) 
("Federal requirements for increased resident participation in redevelopment plan-
ning arose from the backlash from neighborhood destruction in early planning 
efforts."). At the time, James Q. Wilson observed: 
The growth of neighborhood resistance to urban renewal has been gradu-
al and cumulative. Many of the earliest redevelopment projects were 
completed with little organized opposition. Somehow, however, people 
have learned from the experience of others and today, in cities which 
have been engaged in renewal for several years, the planners often find 
prospective renewal areas ready and waiting for them, organized to the 
teeth. 
James Q. Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal, 
in URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 17, at 409. 
Arguably, the experience with the 1956 interstate highway program and its de-
struction of poor neighborhoods also played a role. See generally KENNETH T. 
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1985). 
30 The War on Poverty was originally described as an "anti-riot" bill by the 
New York Times. JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPA-
TION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 222-23 (1990). See generally 
Edgar S. & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE 
L.J. 1317 (1964). 
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was one of the first to conceive of the problems of blacks in 
poor communities as being a problem of "place" rather than 
race-racial discrimination and segregation. Instead, the pro-
gram sought to promote assimilation of poor black ghetto resi-
dents into the mainstream of society and the economy by, 
among other things, strengthening inner-city neighborhoods as 
communities.31 The program mainly attempted to improve 
services in these neighborhoods by utilizing a strong notion of 
participation. Residents would be guided to help themselves by 
participating in community affairs. It was hoped that the pro-
cess of participation would strengthen the local community and 
the participant as well as create pressure for improved services 
for ghetto residents.32 While the origins of this approach were 
largely theoretical and untested, they made a significant con-
tribution to the belief in community participation mandates. 
They failed, however, to provide much guidance on how to ap-
proach the endeavor. 
One of the key programs of the War on Poverty was the 
Economic Opportunity Act's "Community Action Program" 
("Community Action"). Community Action adopted the Gray 
Areas program's idea of participation by residents in the provi-
sion of services. Focused on improving social service delivery in 
the areas of nutrition, employment, and welfare,33 the Com-
munity Action required "maximum feasible participation of the 
poor" in the program.34 This provision was overlooked during 
congressional debates over the bill and thus there is little, if 
any, legislative history explaining its goal or purpose. It be-
came an issue, however, when mayors attempted to organize 
community action boards that were packed with the usual 
array of public officials and civic leaders. In response, many 
black communities organized and demanded authority over the 
program's priorities and decision-making.35 Citizens in many 
31 ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE INNER CITY: A HISTORY OF NEIGHBOR-
HOOD INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 91 (1995). 
32 Id. 
33 Nicholas LeMann, The Unfinished War, 262 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 37, 37, 49 
(1988). 
34 Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-452, § 2, 78 Stat. 508, (for-
merly 42 U.S.C. § 2701) (repealed Pub. L. 97-35, tit. VI, § 683(a), 95 Stat. 519 
(1981». 
3S See MORONE, supra note 30, at 230-31. 
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cities also took the opportunity to speak out on a broad range 
of issues, including unpopular urban renewal projects and poor 
city services.3s In so doing, they forced a more direct response 
to poverty than originally contemplated by the Community 
Action program-new services.37 
A good part of Community Action's focus became participa-
tion itself. Hundreds of independent local organizations (com-
munity action agencies) were created to coordinate a variety of 
service programs including "neighborhood services, education, 
health, manpower, housing, social services, and economic de-
velopment."38 There were protracted struggles over board 
composition and representation on the boards of community 
action agencies to establish the meaning of participation.39 
These conflicts exposed all of the underlying structural con-
flicts in the participatory mandate: What was the meaning of 
participation? Who should be represented on the boards? How 
should representatives be selected? How much decision-making 
authority and power should they have?'o From the city 
government's point of view, the mayor should control the pov-
erty programs and formulate policy with black representatives 
as advisers or in salaried sub-professional roles.41 From the 
36 MORONE, supra note 30, at 236. 
37 See MORONE, supra note 30, at 220-21 (describing the indirect approach to 
poverty contemplated by the Community Action program's precursor, the Gray 
Areas Program which sought to remedy municipal agency failure to coordinate). 
38 See HALPERN, supra note 31, at 108. 
39 The War on Poverty, arguably, channeled the political energy of the move-
ment from struggle over relatively general concepts like "shared power," "freedom," 
or integration to seemingly more concrete battles over the terms of their participa-
tion in the War on Poverty boards. MORONE, supra note 30, at 226-27. Community 
Action Agencies are widely recognized, however, as the agents of integration of 
blacks into local politics and government. HALPERN, supra note 31, at 109-10; 
MORONE, supra note 30, at 248. But see Jacqueline Pope, The Colonizing Impact of 
Public Service Bureaucracies in Black Communities, in RACE, POLITICS AND Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 141 (James Jennings ed., 1992). 
<0 An early task force announced that maximum feasible participation meant at 
least one representative from each neighborhood served by the agency. MORONE, 
supra note 30, at 230. By the spring of 1965, the required number that was to be 
chosen by democratic techniques had expanded to "roughly one third" of the 
agency's governing board. MORONE, supra note 30, at 230. In some cities black 
leaders demanded control over the local CAAs, succeeding in about twenty cities. 
HALPERN, supra note 31, at 109. In 1966, Congress sought to clarify the definition 
of participation and amended the Economic Opportunity Act to require that one-
third of each CAA board be made up of representatives of the poor. Id. at 109-10. 
<I MORONE, supra note 30, at 229. 
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community perspective, they should have control of the expen-
diture of social service and development dollars in their com-
munities. In the early days of the program, the federal 
government's Office of Economic Opportunity ("OEO") accepted 
the role of arbiter in the conflicts and often sided with local 
groups that sought more participation.42 
This mobilization and organization backed by the federal 
government upset the political balance in cities around the 
country. In fact, the most significant aspect of the Community 
Action approach to social services and participation of poor 
residents was that it initially provided for direct funding of 
Community Action Agencies, thus bypassing state and local 
governments. This was "widely regarded by local politicians as 
funding black political opposition right on their turf' and was 
subsequently eliminated.43 
The urban development component of the War on Poverty 
was the Model Cities program.44 The purpose of the Model 
Cities program, as stated by Congress, was "to provide addi-
tional financial and technical assistance to enable cities of all 
sizes . . . to plan, develop and carry out locally prepared and 
scheduled comprehensive city demonstration programs . . . .'>45 
The Model Cities program was intended to address the prob-
42 MORONE, supra note 30, at 230; see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Rebuilding the 
Urban Political System: Some Heresies Concerning Citizen Participation, Communi-
ty Action, Metros, and One ?Jan-One Vote, 58 GEO. L.J. 955, 958-62 (1970) (dis-
cussing OEO and HUD's role in experimenting with various techniques of citizen 
participation). 
43 See LeMann, supra note 33, at 54. 
44 See Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-754, SO Stat. 1255, 1261-66 (referring to planned metropolitan development) 
(formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3313 omitted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5316 (2000) due 
to termination of authority to make grants and loans under this subchapter after 
Jan. 1, 1975); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, tit. II, 78 
Stat. 508, 516-20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (referring 
to "Urban and Rural Community Action Programs"). Many environmental statutes 
passed during the 1970s and 1980s also contained significant enhanced opportuni-
ties for participation in agency decision-making. See, e.g., National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994) (providing for public participa-
tion in preparation of Environmental Impact Statements); Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994, Supp. IV 1998) (providing for oral legislative-
like hearings). 
45 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-754, tit. I, § 101; 80 Stat. 1255 (1966). This language is also found at 42 
U.S.C. § 3301 (2000). 
2000) COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 875 
lems of the physical infrastructure within ghetto neighbor-
hoods and demonstrate that urban development could also be 
inclusive of the poor.46 It attempted to link social services and 
job training to housing and physical community development 
activity in target "model" inner-city neighborhoods in a limited 
number of cities.47 
Cities interested in obtaining a Model Cities grant had to develop an 
elaborate plan for revitalizing the neighborhood ... developed by a 
newly created body called a City Demonstration Agency composed of 
elected officials, representatives of major agencies (e.g., schools, 
housing authorities, health, welfare, employment), labor, and busi-
ness leaders."(S 
The program instead provided for "widespread citizen partici-
pation.'>49 Paradoxically, this provision was intended to mini-
46 The prologue declared: 
[I)mproving the quality of urban life is the most critical domestic problem 
facing the United States. The persistence of widespread urban slums and 
blight, the concentration of persons of low income in older urban areas, 
and the unmet needs for additional housing and community facilities and 
services arising from rapid expansion of our urban population have re-
sulted in a marked deterioration in the quality of the environment and 
the lives of large numbers of our people while the Nation as a whole 
prospers. 
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, "Comprehensive 
City Demonstration Programs," Findings & Declaration of Purpose, Pub. L. No. 89-
754, tit. I, § 101, 80 Stat. 1255. The language can also be found at 42 U.S.C. § 
3301 (2000). 
47 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 121. See generally Otto J. Hetzel & David E. 
Pinsky, Urban Deuelopment Symposium, The Model Cities Program, 22 VAND. L. 
REv. 727 (1969). 
48 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 121. See generally Robert A. Aleshire, Power to 
the People: An Assessment of the Community Action and Model Cities Experience, 
32 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 428 (1972); Katherine A. Hinckley, The Bang and the Whim-
per: Model Cities and Ghetto Opinion, 13 URB. AFF. Q. 131 (Dec. 1977); Special 
Project: Nashville Model Cities: A Case Study, 25 VAND. L. REv. 727 (1972). 
49 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89-754, tit. I, § 101, 80 Stat. 1255. This language is also found at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3303(a)(2). The basic philosophy of the Act was stated by the then newly estab-
lished Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). HUD stated that 
"improving the quality of life of the residents of a model neighborhood can be 
accomplished only by the affirmative action of the people themselves. This requires 
a means of building self-esteem, competence and a desire to participate effectively 
in solving the social and physical problems of their community." North City Area-
Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 456 F.2d 811, 813 n.5 (3d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter 
Romney III (quoting Department of Housing and Urban Development, City Demon-
stration Agency Letter No. 3 (Oct. 30, 1967». 
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mize the level of neighborhood participation in comparison to 
what had taken place under the Community Action program. 
The Community Action program illustrated the difficulties 
of governmental coordination of the technical planning aspects 
of development, along with unanticipated or unstructured com-
munity involvement or contro1.50 The Model Cities program 
was the first attempt to remedy the perceived excesses of Com-
munity Action's participatory mechanisms. The participatory 
mechanisms in the Model Cities program were structured in a 
way that attempted to minimize the level of participation. In 
contrast to Community Action's mandate of maximum feasible 
participation of the poor, Model Cities contained a general re-
quirement of "widespread citizen participation"51 but attempt-
ed to minimize participation by channeling funding of develop-
ment through state and local governmental agencies instead of 
directly' to community groupS.52 Therefore, development could 
take place with the appropriate level of participation-in con-
sultation with neighborhood residents in program planning 
and governance. But, because black ghetto communities were 
relatively organized in a number of cities, the existing federal 
procedures, while minimal, and the relatively close oversight 
gave procedural entree to communities that wanted to protest 
or litigate. For example, in most cities, plans were prepared by 
City Hall before neighborhood residents could mobilize, indeed, 
before they were aware that a new program was being 
50 According to Morone, the idea of community focused efforts of self-empow-
erment was "redolent with implicit threat to established power relations and full 
of promise to the black communities that were struggling for a way to break into 
them." MORONE, supra note 30, at 222. 
51 The Demonstration Cities Act directed the Secretary to "emphasize local ini-
tiative in the planning, development, and implementation" of local programs to 
insure "prompt response to local initiative" on the part of the federal government 
and to ensure that all Model City plans provide for "widespread citizen participa-
tion in the program." Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 
1966, § 103(b)(l)-(2), 80 Stat. at 1257. 
52 See Thomas J. Oliver, Annotation, Validity, Construction, Application of 
"Model Cites" Provisions of Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act 
of 1966, as Amended (42 U.S.CoA §§ 3301-3313), 10 AL.R. FED. 802, 808 (1967) 
("The Model Cities Act requires participation by area residents both in the plan-
ning and in the implementation of a model cities program, although it has been 
recognized that such participation is required only in the sense of consultation 
with government officials, rather than in the sense of a citizen veto or approval 
power."). 
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planned.53 Nonetheless, when residents did learn of program 
plans, many inner-city neighborhoods, educated by their expe-
riences with Community Action, were already organized to 
react quickly to their exclusion from the planning process. 
"When they did react, they discovered that they were able to 
tie up planning or program monies from HUD to a particular 
city, in turn providing further impetus for them to demand a 
role in the program."54 As a result of demands by community 
activists working for political empowerment through self-deter-
mination of local neighborhoods, later Model Cities programs 
provided a process to ensure a role for local communities in 
defining their problems and goals.55 It also provided a blue-
print for the consequences of excluding citizen participation. 
Citizens would resort to their remaining avenue of re-
dress-obstruction, protest, and litigation. 
1. Litigating to Enforce Participation: Too Little Too Late 
While a few groups attempted to use litigation to vindicate 
unfulfilled participation goals, litigation often took too long 
and, even on the rare occasion of a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, accomplished little. For example, one of the cases 
involving a successful challenge to a citizen participation 
scheme, North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney,56 illus-
trates that litigation often produces, at best, mixed results. 
Romney arose out of the City of Philadelphia's proposed Model 
Cities program. The city applied for a grant that proposed to 
use a coalition organization comprised of a combination of local 
organizations, the North City Area-Wide Council ("AWC"), as 
its citizen participation arm.57 AWC's participatory activities 
would include conducting program planning, evaluation, and 
operation. 58 HUD subsequently informed all cities by letter 
53 HALPERN, supra note 31, at 122; see also Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350 . 
• , HALPERN, supra note 31, at 122. See generally Romney II, 456 F.2d 811 (3d 
Cir. 1972). Arnstein noted that citizens were "enraged by previous forms of alleged 
participation [and) refused to be 'conned' again. They threatened to oppose the 
awarding of a planning grant to the city. They sent delegations to HUD in Wash-
ington. They used abrasive language. Negotiations took place under an cloud of 
suspicion and anger." Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350. 
5S HALPERN, supra note 31, at 185. 
56 Romney II, 456 F.2d 811 (3rd Cir. 1972). 
57 Id. at 814. 
58 The City's application concluded that the two basic causes for the conditions 
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that citizen participation groups should only engage in pro-
gram planning and evaluation but were prohibited from "oper-
ating" a Model Cities program.59 HUD administrators then 
indicated to Philadelphia that its Model Cities plan would be 
rejected if the plan continued to utilize AWC's services as a 
program operator.60 The concern was that a conflict of interest 
would result from one entity planning and evaluating a pro-
gram that it also operated.61 Representatives of the AWC ob-
jected strongly to their exclusion from program operation.62 
They requested extra time, however, to consult with their con-
stituents about the exclusion of operations from participa-
tion63 While AWC was seeking input from constituents, the 
city administrator for the program amended the citizen partici-
pation plan to exclude the AWC as the citizen participation 
arm of the Philadelphia program because time was of the es-
sence to meet a HUD deadline.64 AWC brought a class-action 
suit claiming the City's and HUD's actions were in violation of 
the Demonstration Cities Act's citizen participation require-
ments.65 Initially dismissed on summary judgment, the litiga-
tion ensued over the next three years, terminating in a suc-
cessful decision on the merits for AWC in 1972.66 On the sec-
in the target area are poverty and powerlessness and, therefore, a central aim of 
the Philadelphia Program was to provide Model Cities residents with an opportuni-
ty to participate fully in City decisions affecting the target area and to assume 
some control over their own economic resources. North City Area-Wide Council, 
Inc. v. Romney, 399 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1971) !hereinafter Romney 1]. 
The background to this application is interesting. One account reads as fol-
lows: 
Philadelphia wrote its . . . application and waved it at a hastily called 
meeting of community leaders. When those present were asked for an 
endorsement, they angrily protested the city's failure to consult them on 
preparation of the extensive application. . .. [Instead, at) their next 
meeting, citizens handed the city officials a substitute citizen participa-
tion section that changed the ground rules from a weak citizen's advisory 
role to a strong shared power agreement. Philadelphia's application to 
HUD included the citizens' substitution word for word. 
Arnstein, supra note 1, at 350. 
59 Romney II, 456 F.2d at 815. 
60 Id. at 816. 
61 Id. at 815. 
62 Id. at 817. 
63 Id. at 816. 
6' Romney II, 456 F.2d at 816-17. 
65 Id. at 812. 
66 Id. at 818. 
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ond of two appeals, the Third Circuit held that the exclusion of 
AWC was in violation of the participatory provisions of the 
Model Cities Act and implementing regulations.67 The court 
ordered the community group reinstated in the Model Cities 
process.68 The legal victory failed, however, to garner much 
for the organization or the community it represented. While 
the litigation was pending, the planning and implementation of 
the program in Philadelphia had gone on without the required 
participatory groUp.69 Although Philadelphia was ordered to 
and did replace the existing illegal board, there was probably 
little left to decide and less to implement. 
The issues in Romney were at once factual and legal. The 
court's task was to determine if the legally required standard 
for citizen participation had been met: at a minimum, had the 
proper amount of participation taken place. This required the 
court to interpret HUD's vague statutory language and HUD's 
numerous contradictory attempts to clarify the policy. The 
standard of legally required participation the court seemed to 
arrive at was "consultation." Even though the program had 
subsequently proceeded with an independent citizen group in 
place, the issue was what weight the court should give to the 
failure to consult with the original participatory organization 
about the proposed elimination of "operations" from an ap-
proved participatory scheme. The court of appeals chose to 
enforce the participatory mandate in a manner intended to 
discourage cities from using similar maneuvers to exclude or 
bypass legitimate citizen representatives for potentially more 
pliable or less challenging substitutes. From both the 
community's and the city's standpoint, however, the court's 
decision probably represented an unwelcome or disruptive 
intrusion of the dictates of process in an already process-laden 
endeavor. Thus, the Romney case illustrates the problem of 
using litigation to vindicate unfulfilled participatory goals. 
More importantly, however, it also probably served as a cau-
tionary tale for legislators on how not to structure a participa-
tory process. Explicitly stated rights of appeal or enforcement 
mean delay. Since Romney and the Model Cities and Commu-
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Romney II, 456 F.2d at 818. 
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nity Action experiences, participatory provisions have been 
structured to eliminate any legally enforceable participatory 
mandates. Participatory provisions are usually drafted without 
any language that could be interpreted as guaranteeing an 
enforceable right to participation. As a result, later participato-
ry provisions that have followed the Community Action and 
Model City era, such as those in the Community Development 
Block Grant and the Empowerment Zone programs,70 have 
never included language that could ever serve as an enforce-
able mandate in court. While this has served as a pragmatic 
limit on frivolous litigation for leverage by disgruntled or dis-
satisfied community participation advocates, it has also meant 
that citizens have been relatively powerless to enforce partici-
patory mandates that are ignored by local government or that 
fail to provide citizens with a meaningful voice for their needs, 
views, and desires. 
C. Public Hearings and One-Way Participation 
In 1974, the Community Development Block Grant pro-
gram ("CDBG") replaced the Model Cities and other categorical 
grant programs.71 Instead, CDBG provided block grant fund-
ing to all eligible cities to engage in an extensive list of general 
activities related to remedying urban decay.72 This program 
also had the dubious distinction of replacing the strong partici-
patory mandates of the Great Society era with minimal citizen 
participation mechanisms. On the other hand, CDBG's rela-
tively weak mandate has nonetheless been particularly influ-
ential in making participation part of the local scene by provid-
ing a continuous source of funds for local community develop-
ment activities for metropolitan cities and urban counties.73 
70 See infra text accompanying notes 79-90; 92-119. 
71 See generally Catherine Lovell, Community Development Block Grant: The 
Role of Federal Requirements, PUBLIUS (Summer 1983). 
72 The Act lists twenty-five activities eligible for CDBG funds, a number of 
which are specifically geared toward economic development. 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a) 
(2000). For an in-depth discussion of the effectiveness of CDBG as an economic 
development program, see generally Howells, supra note 9. 
73 See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 
tit. I, § 101, 88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1974»; see also DENNIS R. 
JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 227 
(2d ed. 1998). CDBG is an entitlement program that awards funds to eligible 
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CDBG, at least on the face of the statute, states that com-
munity participation is an integral aspect of the program's 
vision and requirements for local planning and decision-mak-
ing with respect to CDBG dollars. The statute program condi-
tions the annual award and use of CDBG funds on city goverI).-
ments providing a detailed citizen participation plan.74 The 
plan is required to encourage participation "by persons of low 
and moderate income who are residents of slum and blight ar-
eas."75 As stated above, the federal government's participatory 
mandates have been instrumental in encouraging local govern-
ments to institutionalize practices geared towards soliciting 
citizen participation. The availability of CDBG funding for 
neighborhood development activities is credited with having 
led to a "concomitant growth in the number of [urban political] 
groups, and the gradual increase in sympathy for them on the 
part of municipal government."76 Therefore, CDBG (as well as 
other federal development programs) has caused cities to be-
come used to working with citizens and consulting with them 
for their views on public development decisions.77 
jurisdictions that apply. CDBG replaced eight categorical programs that required 
jurisdictions to compete for funding that could be used only for the explicit purpos-
es outlined in the programs: Model Cities; Open Space, Urban Beautification and 
Historic Preservation Grants; Public Facility Loans, and Water and Sewer and 
Neighborhood Facilities Grants. Charles E. Connerly & Y. Thomas Liou, Communi-
ty Development Block Grant, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOUSING, supra note 10, at 
64. 
74 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 570.303 (2000). See Jerry L. Mashaw & 
Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalism: A Conceptual Map of 
Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POLY REv. 297, 306 (1996). Mashaw and Dylan 
argued that the block grant format generally arises during Republican administra-
tions and only gives an illusion of local discretion. Id. at 318-24. They further 
argued that block grants come with a list of restrictions on the use of funds and 
that the citizen participation requirement is an example of one of those federal re-
strictions. Id. at 324. ("Thus, it is hardly accurate to think of the states (or locali-
ties) being completely 'free' within a particular policy area to spend in anyway 
they see fit."). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(A). 
76 Robert J. Chaskin & Ali Abunimah, A View from the City: Local Government 
Perspectives on Neighborhood-Based Governance in Community-Building Initiatives, 
21 J. OF URB. AFF. 57, 68 (1999). 
77 Id. In 1995, as part of a consolidation of applications for a variety of block 
grant funds, HUD amended the administrative regulations governing community 
participation in CDBG. The citizen participation plan is now explicitly required to 
provide for and encourage citizen participation in specified stages of the planning 
process. 24 C.F.R. § 91.105(a)(2) (2000). Most significantly, the city must consider 
any comments of citizens received in writing, or orally at the public hearings, and 
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Notwithstanding the quietly influential role this program 
has played, the participatory mandate in the CDBG program 
provides for a very limited form of participation. Adopted in 
the wake of the Model Cities and Community Action era (dur-
ing the Nixon era of the New Federalism), for nearly twenty 
years the CDBG statute merely required public hearings and 
notice. Cities have only to conduct public hearings to obtain 
citizen views to obtain CDBG funding.78 The CDBG statute 
was vague about recommended procedures for these hearings, 
but it required that citizens be provided "with reasonable and 
timely access to local meetings, information, and records relat-
ing to the [city's] proposed use of funds."79 
CDBG's limited community participation provisions led to 
relatively minimal forms of citizen participation. Numerous 
lawsuits claiming the inadequacy of community participation 
provisions have been brought but have been uniformly unsuc-
cessful. Instead, courts typically have found that the statutory 
language provided near-absolute discretion to the cities in 
utilizing minimal citizen participation schemes that were sub-
ject to minimal, if any, oversight by HUD. For example, a 
participatory scheme providing merely an advisory role for 
citizens was consistent with the dictates of the statute. In City 
of Miami v. Rodriguez-Quesada,80 former members of a citizen 
advisory board established by Miami to facilitate citizen partic-
ipation sued after an elected board was dissolved and an ap-
pointive board was installed in its place.81 The court held that 
nothing in CDBG nor its regulations restricts a city in any way 
from determining the manner and means of community in-
attach a summary of these views, including those not accepted and the reasons 
therefore, to the final consolidated plan. Id. at § 91.105(b)(5). In some ways, these 
changes to the CDBG participatory regulations are a noteworthy improvement by 
requiring the cities to provide an explanation and justification for its funding deci-
sions. Nevertheless, they still only allow one-way communication of information to 
the public; any response of approval or disapproval by the community need not 
impact the fmal outcome of the decision. 
78 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(D). 
79 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(3)(B). 
80 388 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
81 This case also demonstrates that the motives may not always be pure in 
community participation. According to the record, the City took this action because 
the Board had not provided an opportunity for residents to voice their opinions 
and had alienated resident participation within the area. Id. at 259. 
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put.82 According to the court, "the Act requires community 
input; however, this input is advisory in nature."83 
Even where public hearings allowed only for minimal time 
to testify, and thus provided inadequate time to present differ-
ent suggestions for budget allocation decisions, the participato-
ry structure was upheld. In Broaden u. Harns,84 community 
organizations representing low-income minority residents 
sought to enjoin the CDBG program in Pittsburgh, charging 
that the program allocations for public works and recreation 
failed to allocate sufficient resources to the needs of low in-
come families and renters, and that citizens were only granted 
five minutes at the public hearings to give their views on fund 
allocations. The court held that the standard of what was ade-
quate citizen participation was based on whether the city certi-
fies it to be adequate.85 Pittsburgh exceeded the minimum re-
quirement of holding two hearings by also mailing letters to 
concerned individuals and groups and by holding public work-
shops to explain the scope of the Act prior to submitting each 
application. 
Similarly, in N.A.A.C.P. u. Hills,86 a Santa Rosa, Califor-
nia program was challenged because it failed to provide funds 
for low- and moderate-income housing and included inadequate 
opportunities for citizen participation in the development of 
Santa Rosa's plan. The court decided that the plan was ade-
quate because the application had been considered by an advi-
sory commission and because four public hearings (~everal of 
which were attended by only a few persons but one of which 
was attended by over 100 persons) provided citizens with suffi-
cient opportunities to make their views known.87 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 451 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D. Pa. 1978). 
85 Id. at 1225. 
86 412 F. Supp. 102 <N.D. Cal. 1976). 
87 Id. at 111-12; see also ffister County Cmty. Action Comm., Inc. v. Koenig, 
402 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Koenig, a community-based corporation sued 
to enjoin CDBG charging, inter alia, that the city had failed to comply with the 
citizen participation requirements. Id. at 990. The court held that the city had 
complied with the requirement by appointing members of a Community Develop-
ment Advisory Council and by holding two public hearings attended by 150 per-
sons that included distribution of HUD rules and regulations showing the range of 
eligible activities under HCDA. Id. at 989-90. Newspaper reports of each step of 
the application process and the city's proposals for use of the money ensured that 
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The preceding cases were decided correctly by the various 
courts. Although the legislative history is silent, it seems safe 
to assume that the legislation for CDBG following, as it did, on 
the heels of the Great Society program participation experi-
ence, was intentionally weakened to provide for minimal forms 
of citizen participation. It was drafted to fulfill the vision of 
planning as being a technical, expert-driven process that ulti-
mately should be controlled by local government decision-mak-
ers. Citizens would have a say, but they would not have any 
ability to see that their voice actually had an impact on CDGB 
project priorities and spending decisions. 
1. Political Federalism and Federal Deference 
In addition to the minimal participation envisioned by the 
program, CDBG also excluded any federal agency, including 
HUD, from exercising substantive oversight over the nature 
and effectiveness of the citizen participation program. This in 
effect meant that citizens would not have the right to appeal to 
a higher authority if the city did not provide a meaningful 
participatory process or was unresponsive to citizen views 
aired at pubic meetings. In fact, a city is able to satisfy the 
CDBG participatory scheme requirement merely by its own 
certification that it had complied. In Nickols v. Pierce,88 in re-
sponse to a challenge to a community participation plan, the 
court found that HUD was not required to conduct an indepen-
dent investigation to ascertain whether an applicant had actu-
ally complied with the citizen participation requirements for 
the preapplication or application.89 Rather, HUD was permit-
ted to rely upon the certification or assurance provided by the 
applicant.90 Therefore, the view of participation during the 
CDBG era was" that participation should largely be passively 
receptive of information with citizen opinions merely advisory. 
the public was adequately informed. Id. at 990. 
88 556 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
89 Id. at 1295. 
90 Other difficulties included standing. See generally George D. Brown, Federal 
Funds and Federal Courts-Community Development Litigation as a Testing 
Ground for the New Law of Standing, 21 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1980); Janet Varon, 
Passing The Bucks: Procedural Protections Under Federal Block Grants, 18 HARv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (1983). 
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Accordingly, courts would not interfere to ensure that the feed-
back was either effective or taken into account in city decision-
making about the distribution of CDBG funds. As a concession 
to political federalism or comity principles, HUD would not 
intervene in the substantive participatory decisions made at 
the local level. The Model Cities and Community Action experi-
ences left a hard-forgotten lesson that disrupting or altering 
local political relationships was politically costly. 
D. Front-Loading Enforcement: Mandating Participation for 
Eligibility 
The discussion thus far has painted a picture of an ebb 
and flow of participatory structures in development. Weak 
participation structures in the urban renewal era were fol-
lowed by strong participatory structures in the Great Society 
programs, which were then followed by the weak participation 
of the CDBG era. Accordingly, the more recent participatory 
structures mandated in federal development programs (e.g., 
the Empowerment Zone program) contain what appear to be 
textually strong participatory mechanisms reminiscent of the 
Community Action and Model Cities days. 
The Empowerment Zone Program is an economic develop-
ment program that provides tax incentives to encourage busi-
nesses to relocate to the inner city, as well as federal funding 
for complementary economic development activities. In con-
trast to the limited nature of CDBG participatory provisions, 
the Empowerment Zones community participation mandate 
was structured in a way that was more strongly supportive of 
active community participation-community participation was 
built in up front as a required element for qualifying for funds 
that were to be awarded to a limited number of cities. The 
Empowerment Zone legislation, contained in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA"),91 included a 
front-loaded enforcement mechanism for the participatory 
mandate. To be designated an Empowerment Zone, cities had 
91 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1397D (1994) 
(amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 951-952, 111 
Stat. 788, 885, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 678 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 1391 (2000»). 
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to submit an application with a strategic plan for mobilizing 
and coordinating state, local, private, and community resourc-
es.92 The strategic plan had to contain a "process by which the 
affected community is a full partner in the process of develop-
ing and implementing the plan and the extent to which local 
institutions and organizations have contributed to the planning 
process."93 Therefore, Empowerment Zones ostensibly con-
ceived of participation in a much more substantial way. Ac-
cordingly, as an initial matter, participation was a very impor-
tant aspect of qualifying for the initial round (Round I) of zone 
designations.94 As the following discussion will demonstrate, 
however, it has not always been clear what exactly it means to 
make an "affected community" a full partner. The exact mean-
ing of the phrase was subject to interpretation, which cities 
were inclined to interpret narrowly or minimally. Moreover, 
once zone designation was made, the local political circum-
stances dictated the extent to which the participatory mandate 
was followed during the implementation process. The overall 
participatory experience in the Empowerment Zones program 
was less than positive, productive or meaningful. 
1. Struggles to Define and Organize Participation 
During competition for Round I of Empowerment Zone 
designations, each city struggled to come up with a process 
that met the ambitious, but nevertheless vague, statutory 
goals.95 The principal goal seemed to be that a collection of 
heads is better than one. In particular, the goal seemed to be 
to allow all who had a stake in the process to benefit from the 
process. Under HUD regulations, "[t]he people involved in the 
92 26 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(A). 
93 26 U.S.C. § 1391(t)(2)(B). 
9< In 1997, Congress authorized twenty additional Empowerment Zones (fifteen 
urban and five rural) eligible to receive federal tax incentives but not SSBG funds. 
See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, reprinted in 
1997 U.S.C.C.AN. 678 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1391). While designations were 
made during 1998, they were not effective until January 1, 2000. Id. 
95 See, e.g., Partnering for Empowerment (Zones), 2 EZ EXCHANGE: THE NATION-
AL EMPOWERMENT ZONE QUARTERLY 1, 1-2 (Egan Urban Center, SummerlFall 
1997) (noting the perplexing vagueness of the participation mandate and conflicting 
signals from HUD about whether participation should come mainly from partner-
ships among organizations or resident participation). 
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development of the strategic plan and implementation of the 
components must represent all who have a stake in the future 
of each designated area's neighborhoods and the larger commu-
nity."96 The importance of this element was emphasized by a 
checklist of questions designed to ensure collaborative compli-
ance with this element.97 
The HUD explanatory literature also suggested goals of 
bottom up, popular control, reminiscent of the War on Poverty 
era: "Residents decide what happens in their neighborhoods, 
not federal officials in Washington."98 The assumption ap-' 
pears to be that if federal officials are not involved in dictating 
the details of programmatic design and implementation at the 
9& U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED 
STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR EMPOWERMENT ZONES AND ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES, 
BUILDING COMMUNITIES TOGETHER, HUD-1443-CPD, at 6 (Jan. 1994). This partici-
patory mandate evidenced three. dimensions: stakeholder theory, participatory theo-
ry, and planning theory. 
97 Applicant cities were required to: (1) describe the specific groups, organiza-
tions, and individuals participating in the production of the plan and describe the 
history of these groups in the community; (2) explain how participants were select-
ed and provide evidence that the participants, taken as a whole, broadly represent 
the racial, cultural, and economic diversity of the community; (3) describe the role 
of the participants in the creation, development, and future implementation of the 
plan; (4) identify two or three topics addressed in the plan that caused the most 
serious disagreements among participants and describe how those disagreements 
were resolved; (5) explain how the community participated in choosing the area to 
be nominated and why the area was nominated; and (6) provide evidence that key 
participants have the capacity to implement the plan. 24 C.F.R. § 597.200(d) 
(1999). 
The checklist provides a window into understanding the various intentions 
underlying the participation requirement: element two obliquely acknowledges that 
racial identity might be a factor but couches it in terms of diversity, assuming 
that diversity will ensure that a wide range of views are included in the collabora-
tive planning process. Element four suggests a process-oriented goal-that the pur-
pose of the collaboration is process and the lessons to be learned from the expect-
ed disagreements and agreements. The element six requirement of demonstrated 
capacity means that organizational expertise and ability to accomplish goals is an 
important part of the collaborative participation process. This element's goal orien-
tation would militate against a citizen-oriented, grassroots process. The difference 
in emphasis between elements four and six reveal the difficulty in reconciling 
participatory processes that emphasize the benefits of an ostensibly inclusive plan-
ning process that is meant to be empowering with an economic development pro-
cess that emphasizes particular economic goals. 
98 U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Commu-
nity Initiative, at http://www.hud.gov/cpdlezeclezecinit.html (last visited Mar. 30, 
2001); see also U.S. DEPT OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., BUILDING COMMUNITIES To-
GETHER: URBAN EMPOWERMENT ZONES & ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES APPLICATION 
GUIDE, HUD-1552-CPD (July 1995). 
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local level, then the process would be an authentically commu-
nity-controlled process. Notwithstanding the suggestion that 
popular political control was the goal, this view was not rein-
forced with any enforcement mechanisms in the Empowerment 
Zone empowerment program. While HUD retains the ability to 
decommission the entire Empowerment Zone for failure to 
comply with any provision of the Empowerment Zone authoriz-
ing statute, such a sanction is unlikely and disproportionately 
harsh.99 
2. Money's Influence: United Application and Divided 
Participation 
In terms of fostering participation, the Round I Empower-
ment Zones participatory process' shining hour was the appli-
cation process. At that stage, the participation requirement 
was an element of eligibility, and cities took these require-
ments relatively seriously and sponsored extensive 
participatory activities. Communities held mass meetings and 
formed smaller charrettes and discussion groupS.1oo Conflicts 
and disagreements arising from fundamental diverging points 
of view were quickly suppressed and put aside in the excite-
ment of competing for designation. Thus, processes were open 
for what were for sometimes collaborative, «visioning" planning 
processes. Professional staff or consultants in New York and 
Philadelphia, for example, solicited a wide range of public 
input and participation to design local programs. 101 While 
New York's program was ultimately the least inclusive of ordi-
nary community residents, other cities like Baltimore and 
Philadelphia outdid themselves at the application stage of the 
process by using a wide base of input to construct revitaliza-
tion plans. 102 
99 See 26 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000). 
100 See MARILYN GI'ITELL & RATHE NEWMAN, HOWARD SAMUELS STATE MANAGE-
MENT AND POLICY CENTER, EMPOWERMENT ZONE IMPLEMENTATION: COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION AND COMMUNITY CAPACITY 7 (1998) (expanded case study of the 
initial organizing phase of the Empowerment Zone participation process). 
101 Marilyn Gittell & Kathe Newman, Expanding Civic Opportunity: Urban Em-
powerment Zones, 33 URB. AFF. REv. 530, 535 (1998). 
102 ld. at 535-39. 
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3. Privatized Participation and Public Competition 
Following designation of Employment Zone cities, the em-
phasis on community representation and participation in Em-
powerment Zone governance changed from community involve-
ment to organizational inclusion. Following designation, most 
cities established relatively centralized governance structures, 
often placing a private, non-profit corporation in charge of Zone 
activities. lo3 Ideally, these management corporations would 
act not only as providers of funding, but also as intervention 
agents who would "change the ways in which public agencies, 
private [business] firms, nonprofit organizations, and commu-
nity groups interacted."104 By facilitating relationships among 
the variety of local groups and organizations, "they could begin 
to think of themselves as a common domain, define common 
problems, and set common directions."105 
It turned out, however, that federal participation and the 
funding eligibility requirement in Empowerment Zones was 
initially very disruptive. By creating "new catchment area 
boundaries and eligibility requirements[,] ... [Empowerment 
Zones] disturbed existing relations."lOG Yet existing structures 
for development reasserted themselves relatively quickly. Ac-
cording to the Gittell and Newman study, "elite networks com-
posed of mayors, foundation officers and development interme-
diaries were influential in promoting established community 
development corporations as the community participants in 
each city and in moving the designs for the Empowerment 
Zones toward traditional business development approach-
es."107 Also, the goal of facilitating interaction among busi-
ness, government, and community never happened. There was 
103 Id. at 542. Some cities created an unincorporated operating board with Phil-
adelphia and New York City, dividing the zone into smaller independently operat-
ing zones. Some cities (Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit) added local community 
clusters along with their central boards. The local community cluster structures af-
forded more community and community-based organizational involvement. Atlanta 
and Baltimore created citizen advisory boards that review all EZ actions. Id. at 
542-43. 
104 Id. 
105 Howell S. Baum, Education and the Empowerment Zone: Ad Hac Develop-
ment of an Interorganizational Domain, 21 J. URB. AFF. 289, 289 (June 22, 1999). 
100 Id. 
107 Gittell & Newman, supra note 101, at 554. 
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little contact between community organizations and businesses 
investing in the Zone. Notwithstanding the presence of busi-
ness representatives on the governing boards, business repre-
sentatives contended that governance processes take too long 
and that there is too much conflict among community repre-
sentatives.lOB According to Gittell and Newman, "[n]ew busi-
nesses or businesses that expand within the Zone[] have little 
incentive. .. to work with Empowerment Zone governance 
boards or governance structures. Instead, they frequently by-
pass these organizations and go directly to the city economic 
development agency."109 Gittell and Newman concluded, accu-
rately, that businesses did not need to work with Empower-
ment Zone governance structures to hire zone residents or be 
eligible for the tax incentives.llo 
To the extent that community participation did exist, 
much of that participation centered initially around discordant 
and competitive struggles over representation on governance 
boards. The community participation process in each city was 
characterized by initial years of disorganization as a variety of 
people and institutions-with a variety of goals, desires, and 
motivations-struggled, argued, and fought over governance 
issues within each Empowerment Zone. Each city's conflict 
centered around three similar issues: (1) numeric community 
representation on central boards, (2) defining or identifying 
proper or authentic community representatives, and (3) fight-
ing over whether economic development or social service pro-
grams would be the program's priority. Also, fights over decen-
tralized or centralized control were common. The fights repre-
sented many things. To some, they reflected a necessary and 
healthy process of participation and negotiation.1l1 To others 
both inside and outside of the process, the conflicts represented 
the futility of including disaffected people in a sophisticated 
process of problem solving.112 Oddly, the conflict over repre-
108 GI'ITELL & NEWMAN, supra note 100, at 7. 
109 Id. at 7. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 597.200(d) (1999) (identifying two or three topics ad-
dressed in the plan that caused the most serious disagreements among partici-
pants and describing how those disagreements were resolved). 
112 This argument can be discounted to the extent that participatory mecha-
nisms usually involve the leaders of the beneficiary communities. This point also 
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sentation, to some extent, brought community organizations 
together in strategic alliances. According to Gittell and 
Newman, however, while "the struggle for representation on 
governance boards brought community organizations togeth-
err,] . . . the competition for money divided them."113 The of-
ten fierce competition over the allocation of resources was in 
part related to turf protection. For example, city council mem-
bers in Detroit and Chicago competed with community organi-
zations for funds-the council members argued that they 
should be involved in decisions affecting their districts.114 
The competition over resources also reflected a disagree-
ment over programmatic priorities. Project selection and focus 
were primarily determined by city officials or Empowerment 
Zone professional staff who took charge of writing benchmarks, 
thus giving themselves a decisive role in the process. ll5 
Gittell notes, however, that priorities between Empowerment 
Zone staff and community representatives differed. Indeed, 
community representatives had a different definition of eco-
nomic development from professional staff. They wanted social 
services and programs that would develop "community assets 
such as micro-enterprises owned by residents."116 The com-
munity view often contrasted sharply with that of Empower-
ment Zone professional staff members who tended to stress 
recruiting established businesses to the Zone.ll7 
Over time, substantial compliance with the participatory 
mechanisms has decreased, become nominal, or ceased. This 
may be due in part to the fact that neither the statute nor the 
regulations provided any explicit enforcement mechanism other 
than revocation of designation.118 Other than a general over-
raises the question of whether widespread educational benefits accrue in fact to a 
significant number of poor residents. See Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 110-
11 ("The poor, renters and minorities are insufficiently represented in neighbor-
hood planning processes. Thus, even where neighborhood planning has been pro-
moted as an agent of redistribution, such as the Community Action Program of 
the War on Poverty, it has not lived up to its potential to produce social equity."). 
113 GITrELL & NEWMAN, supra note 100, at 8. 
mId. at 7. 
115 Id. at 9. 
116 Id. at 9-10. 
117 Id. 
118 26 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2000) (authorizing HUD Secretary to revoke Empower-
ment Zone designation for failure to make progress in meeting the benchmarks set 
forth in the strategic plan). 
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sight by HUD, no ongoing explicit standards or requirements 
applied other than the standards and benchmarks supplied by 
each city's strategic plan and adopted operating structure. The 
more significant reason, however, might be that the federal 
incentive to make an effort to seek that participation ended 
after the application process was completed. While the commu-
nity was initially drawn in for purposes of being awarded des-
ignation as a zone, they were for the most part gradually 
pushed to the side of the economic development component of 
the program.119 This does not mean that cities did not try to 
comply with the community participation mandate, but it is 
not clear that anyone ever really determined the actual goal of 
community participation. And, without an overarching goal 
other than community involvement, the situation became com-
plicated and contentious. The tendency was to move the direct 
community participation to the side either by having them 
make no decisions or by having them make decisions on topics 
marginal to the entire process of economic development. There-
fore, it is useful to consider what value or purpose participa-
tion is supposed to fulfill. Perhaps a considered examination of 
the possible justifications could help to make sense of why we 
go through the time and bother of direct community involve-
ment in development. 
II. THEORIES OF PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT IN THREE 
DIMENSIONS 
In light of the tendency for weak, as well as seemingly 
strong, community participatory mandates to lead to communi-
ty marginalization or exclusion, why should direct community 
participation exist? This Part considers the underlying theoret-
ical arguments and justifications for such participation. Each 
theory, while conceptually overlapping in its normative bases 
and claims, establishes relatively distinct goals for what local 
governments, individual citizens, and black communities are 
supposed to get out of participation. The types of justifications 
119 See generally Renee Berger, People, Power, Politics: An Assessment of Federal 
Empowerment Zones: Empowerment Zones I Enterprise Communities Program, 63 
PLANNmG 4 (Feb. 1997); Mitchell L. Moss, Where's the Power in Empowerment 
Zone?, 5 CITY J. 76 (Spring 1995). 
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for participation fall into three general normative categories: 
(1) instrumental theories stemming from bureaucratic rational-
ism and pragmatism that answer the question of how local 
governments benefit from participation, (2) democratic theories 
promising self-development and transformation that answer 
the question of what an individual citizen obtains from partici-
pation, and (3) empowerment or political control theories on 
behalf of low-income black communities that answer the ques-
tion of how a low-income black community can benefit as a 
whole. 
A. Local Governments and Extrinsic Theories of Participation 
The first category of justifications for participation is the 
most familiar and, at least on the surface, seems to make the 
most sense. These justifications are instrumental arguments 
that pragmatically consider participatory processes to be valu-
able for extrinsic reasons-for what they contribute to utilitari-
an goals of administrative, bureaucratic, and managerial effi-
ciency. In other words, participation is merely a useful means 
to an efficient end. Local governments use citizen participation 
schemes not because of a commitment to any intrinsic values 
of participation for citizens, but for their extrinsic value to 
local government administration. The following discussion will 
first contextualize this theoretical position within the context 
of local urban development and then proceed to examine the 
instrumental justifications of participation. 
1. The Backdrop to Instrumentalism: The Spatiali~ed 
Imperative of Growth 
The definition of urban development has narrowed in 
recent years to focus specifically on economic development. The 
emphasis is now on providing business incentives and tax 
abatements for business corporations to encourage them to 
relocate to or remain within a particular municipality or re-
gion. As the emphasis has narrowed, however, the elite-driven 
process of development has become even more attenuated.120 
120 Two commentators have noted: 
The development and ownership of industrial properties have been trans-
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Local economic development is now specifically structured to 
meet the high-end service, entertainment, and shopping needs 
of the "global elite" -and to promote tourism to attract subur-
ban visitors.121 Recent federal urban economic development 
programs have attempted to capitalize on these trends by pro-
viding for the creation of zones within cities where federal tax 
incentives and other federal funds are made available to en-
courage local economic development in impoverished areas. 
This approach is flawed, however, because it ignores racialized 
space in cities and attempts to direct development to the areas 
that exist on the "wrong side" of the inner-city boundary-the 
side that is racialized black and classified poor.122 Economic 
development is not meant to take place on this side of the 
boundary because this is the site where "the Other," or 
undesirably different person, is located. Moreover, these places 
carry the burden of very loaded, negative images of poverty, 
crime, and danger. They and their inhabitants are places and 
people to be avoided. The question that remains is whether 
mandating community participation can counteract this "geog-
raphy of economic development" and work to the benefit of 
impoverished communities. 
formed in the past few decades. Most industrial properties were once 
purpose-built by the owner and subsequent user. Today, industrial space 
is more likely to be built by developers acting speculatively, leasing to 
users, and managing the properties as part of their portfolios. 
MICHAEL A PAGANO & ANN O'M. BOWMAN, CITYSCAPES AND CAPITAL: THE POLI-
TICS OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 12 (1995). 
121 See Robert A Beauregard & Anne Halla, The Unavoidable Incompleteness of 
the City, 1997 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 327, 328 (1997) (noting "the multiple 
business centers, transformed waterfronts, gentrified neighborhoods and hollowed-
out zones of manufacturing of the late 20th century city and the influence of an 
increasingly delocalized ownership of propertY'). 
122 See McFarlane, supra note 7, at 337-42; see also John O. Calmore, 
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing a Stone of Hope from a 
Mountain of Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1236-38 (1995) (tracing the role of 
racialization and racialized space in configuring residential segregation); Richard 
Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1913 (1994) (demonstrating that law creates and perpetu-
ates racially identified spaces); Alastair Bonnett, Geography, 'Race' and Whiteness: 
Invisible Traditions and Current Challenges, 29 AREA 193, 199 (1997) (pointing out 
that racialized space does not only refer to black space but also white space and 
that white space tends to be viewed as socially transparent, normative, neutral, 
banal, dull, noncontroversial, and normal). 
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Economic development is carried out through a set of pri-
vatized structures and processes designed primarily, if not 
exclusively, to meet the needs of business elites and to encour-
age capital investment in particular geographic areas to pro-
mote growth and increase land prices and rents.123 That pro-
cess is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and shielded 
from public scrutiny.124 This is accomplished through elites 
wielding informal channels of power, as well as quasi-private 
government entities, such as public authorities, operating free 
from public scrutiny. 125 
Conventional wisdom" is that a measure of good city man-
agement is the extent to which it provides a hospitable envi-
ronment for business.126 The actors in the economic develop-
123 See JOlIN R. LoGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62, 73 (1987). 
12' See MATl'HIAS STIEFEL & MARsHALL WOLFE, A VOICE FOR THE EXCLUDED: 
POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT: UTOPIA OR NECESSITY? 10 (1994) ("The 
characteristic contemporary patterns of economic growth, of modernization and of 
nation-building all have strongly anti-participatory traits. . .. Societies develop 
complex batteries of defenses against popular participation."); Robert A. 
Beauregard, Constituting Economic Development: A Theoretical Perspective, in THE-
ORIES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES FROM ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 
267 (Richard D. Bingham & Robert Mier eds., 1993) (attributing the scant critical 
assessment of economic development to its "inherent sensibility, avowed pragma-
tism and unflinching optimism [that] overwhelm[s] intensive probing of its theoret-
ical tendencies and ideological biases"). 
125 See generally RoGER G. NOLL & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, SPORTS, JOBS, AND 
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (1997) (discussing 
the use of publicly unaccountable stadium authorities to finance, construct, and 
operate the recently proliferating sports stadia); see also ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA., 
DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT 139 (1996) ("[Aluthorities are created for anti-democratic purposes-the eva-
sion of rules that apply to government itself."). 
126 See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 122, at 59 (describing the official Fantus 
ranking of business climate based on taxation, labor, legislation, unemployment 
compensation, scale of government, and public indebtedness and noting that a 
1975 survey by the Industrial Development Research Council of corporate exec-
utives responsible for site selection decisions ranked states simply as "cooperative," 
"indifferent," or "anti-growth"); see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 68 (1990). Young wrote: 
Despite •.. rhetoric to the contrary, the primary beneficiary of big gov-
ernment • . . is private enterprise. . . . Government creates institutions 
and develops policies explicitly aimed at promoting the long-term inter-
ests of capital accumulation. To this end, federal and sometimes local 
government regulates the economic system through tax policy, monetary 
policy, tariffs and import-export trade policies, debt spending, farm and 
corporate subsidies, and regulation of its own spending levels. 
Id. at 68-69. 
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ment process have been labeled a "growth coalition" that works 
in concert with government officials to turn each city into a 
"growth machine."127 These descriptive labels arise because in 
many municipalities, economic development is a process con-
trolled by a political alliance of public officials, businessmen 
(particularly those involved in property investment, develop-
ment, and real estate financing), and bureaucrats. l28 Aided 
by a discourse or narrative of economic development that relies 
on terms like ''business-friendly,'' "public-private partnership," 
and "empowerment,,,129 the growth coalition operates to chan-
nel expressed citizen interests into a system of land-use deci-
sions oriented towards the imperative to promote growth.130 
The dominance and hegemony of the economic develop-
ment narrative and the irresistible nature of its privatized 
processes overshadows community perspectives about quality 
of life in neighborhoods and community voices clamoring for 
services. Instead, under the local economic development dis-
127 LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 122, at 50. 
128 Id. at 62-85. Cities are the site where the growth coalition operates and is 
therefore referred to as "the growth machine." Id. at 32-37; see also Richard C. 
Feiock & James C. Clingermayer, Development Policy Choice: Four Explanations 
for City Implementation of Economic Development Policies, 22 AM. REv. OF PUB. 
ADMIN. 49, 60 (1992) (arguing that the building industry unions play a great role 
in directing municipal resources towards economic development to protect and 
provide jobs). But see Richard C. Box, Critical Theory and the Paradox of Dis-
course, 25 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 1, 8 (1995) (arguing that the growth coalition 
theory fails to account for differences between communities). 
129 See Rob Atkinson, Discourses of Partnership and Empowerment in Contempo-
rary British Urban Regeneration, 36 URBAN STUDIES 59, 60 (1999) ("The mere exis-
tence of an official discourse advocating empowerment and partnership is no guar-
antee that it will actually [take place because) the organizational contexts in 
which discursive practices operate are also sites of power relationships and contes-
tation."}. 
130 See David Wilson, Metaphors, Growth Coalition Discourses and Black Poverty 
Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPODE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors 
used in "growth" discourse in urban development). As two commentators observed: 
City development responses are path dependent: they lock in the protect-
ed interests of certain sectors of the business community as well as solu-
tion sets linked to factor costs. This limits the city's ability over time to 
adjust to changing constituencies and to address emergent problems unre-
lated to factor-cost issues. Local institutions continue to reflect this legacy 
of interests and economic growth models, particularly those articulated by 
past federal programs. 
Susan E. Clarke & Gary L. Gaile, Local Politics in a Global Era: Thinking Local-
ly, Acting Globally, 551 THE .ANNALS: GLOBALIZATION AND THE CHANGING U.S. CITY 
28, 37 (David Wilson ed., May 1997) (emphasis added). 
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course, a more beneficial long-term approach to providing jobs 
and job training supposedly will eliminate, once and for all, the 
need for social services. 131 Local government law supports 
economic development as a private endeavor, immune from 
public control or accountability, through the use of autonomous 
public authorities that routinely handle economic development 
without citizen input or influence.132 Therefore, participation 
has a heavy burden of countering marginalization of poor black 
communities and residents by adequately taking into account 
the intensely political and spatialized nature of the economic 
development process.133 Many believe that community input 
is inconsistent and unnecessary for economic development. 134 
2. The Instrumental Value of Participation to Local 
Government 
Somewhat ironically, despite the intensely political, 
spatialized, and privatized nature of economic development, 
participation has turned out to be a useful tool for local gov-
ernments. AB commentators have observed, in many if not 
131 For example, at a community organizing meeting held at an elementary 
school in 1996 in Baltinlore in connection with the Empowerment Zone, I recall an 
elderly woman speaking up to request help to fix her home that was in disrepair. 
She was dismissively informed that this process was about jobs. 
132 Public authorities and special districts have been held immune from the 
constitutional guarantees of one-person, one-vote, in part because they embody an 
expectation of private decision-making immune from public input because they are 
primarily conceived of as business enterprises. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 
368-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 
U.S. 719, 734 (1973); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 100-
03 (2d Cir. 1998). In the context of the Empowerment Zone, a number of early 
news accounts reflected the privatized nature of local structures of economic devel-
opment. See Board Officials Clash, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 1995, at 11 (report-
ing that a rural Empowerment Zone Board President (Rio Grande) correctly point-
ed out that Rio Grande EZ is a private corporation and thus was not required to 
comply with Texas open meetings laws); Joseph Gerth, Chicken-Plant Opponents 
Frustrated by Hearing, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, July 5, 1999, at Al (reporting that 
to comply with participation requirement, rural EZ Board merely held a public 
hearing in order to be eligible to use $1 million to purchase land for a chicken 
processing plant). 
133 See Beauregard, supra note 123, at 270 (describing economic development as 
an intensely political process). 
134 See Box, supra note 127, at 8 (noting that to the extent the growth coalition 
controls a city, the less possible it will be for city administrators to represent the 
interests of citizens who do not share the growth machine's goals). 
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most cases, "cities may work with organizations for purely 
instrumental purposes, as mechanisms through which to sup-
port particular kinds of activities."135 Municipalities often call 
on neighborhood groups to review plans or budgets, develop 
neighborhood plans, or assist in the provision of services.136 
One benefit of community input has been that it allows cities 
to take into account unique needs and sensibilities of various 
sub-areas.137 Also, participation can serve as an important 
vehicle for introducing a project to a proposed community, 
gauging its support or opposition, and providing a forum for 
civic activity on matters of immediate interest to city resi-
dents.13s "Public officials see a benefit in working through 
identifiable community leaders who can broker relationships 
between them and the network of local actors unknown to 
them and who can provide apparent legitimacy to government 
activities in the neighborhood."139 Therefore, community par-
ticipation is primarily sought for its instrumental value in 
facilitating information gathering and as a political feed-back 
mechanism. In other words, community participation can, to a 
certain extent, promote administrative efficiency. 
But local governments operate under dual pressures. With 
the advent of CDBG and its participatory norm (however mini-
mal), local governments have either felt pressured or become 
accustomed to including citizen groups in public decision-mak-
ing.140 On the other hand, local governments have an ongoing 
135 Chaskin & Abunimah, supra note 76, at 67. 
13<1 Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 100. 
137 Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 100. 
138 See, -e.g., Frank Benest, Engaging Citizens in the Bottom Line, AM. CITY & 
COUNTY (Dec. 1997) (recommending participatory annual budget process to create 
public support for difficult decisions); Michele Frisby & Monica Bowman, The Fu-
ture of Local Government: Involving Citizens in Community Decision-Making, 78 
PUB. MGMT. at Al (Feb. 1996) (surveying proactive varieties of participatory 
schemes); Rob Gurwitt, A Government That Runs on Citizen Power, GoVERNING 
MAG. 48, 48-50 (Dec. 1992) (profiling local governments that use citizen participa-
tion as a way to engage and retain residents). 
139 Chaskin & Abunimah, supra -note 76, at 75. 
1<0 Considerations of efficiency and effectiveness do not provide easy answers to 
difficult questions of how to select appropriate community representatives. "In most 
cases, the relationship with a neighborhood organization may be used as a proxy 
for neighborhood participation, out of a belief that the organization is well-enough 
grounded in the neighborhood to carry sufficient local influence." Id. at 69. The 
other question is decision-making authority. Should community groups have actual 
decision-making power? Most often, local government officials "considered the 
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obligation to try to provide efficient and effective services and 
administrative processes.141 The goal of administrative effi-
ciency is certainly laudable, but it means that participation 
that is often laborious, time-consuming, or potentially disrup-
tive can quickly lose its appearance of efficiency.142 Is partici-
pation still justified when it involves delay or disruption? This 
is an important question because it requires us to look beyond 
instrumental justifications that are otherwise so appealing.143 
In particular, two problems result from a purely instru-
mental justification for, and view of, participation. Because 
economic development is privatized and elite-driven, instru-
mental justifications by definition mean that community mem-
bers should not be included in decisions regarding economic 
development because they have nothing valuable to contribute 
to the decision.144 The governmental decision-making agenda 
towards economic development is predetermined, and thus, 
community views or input will rarely, if ever, be useful. There-
fore, instrumental justifications succeed in making community 
exclusion from agenda-setting seem rational and inevita-
ble.145 Instrumental theories thus would apparently dictate 
neighborhood's role in principally advisory terms, making clear their concerns and 
priorities in ways that both inform and respond to city plans." Id. Chaskin and 
Abunimah note that a few local government officials think, in contrast, "that 
neighborhoods should play a more driving role and take on more direct responsi-
bility for development planning and activity." Id. 
141 See generally Gary Woller, Toward a Reconciliation of The Bureaucratic and 
Democratic Ethos, 30 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 85 (1998). 
U2 Richard D. Margerum, Getting Past Yes: From Capital Creation to Action, 65 
J. AM. PLANNING AsSN 181, 190 (1999) ("[O)rganizations must be willing to with-
stand higher transaction costs. Decisions involving more consultation will require 
more time, and may require more personnel and resources."). 
1<3 See Brent Wall, Assessing Ethics Theories from a Democratic Viewpoint, in 
ETHICAL FRONTIERS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: SEEKING NEW STRATEGIES FOR RE-
SOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS 135 (James S. Bowman ed., 1991) (noting public 
administration's lack of a "legitimate normative frame of reference for administra-
tive action"). 
1« Studies have shown that participatory structures in New York City, for ex-
ample, have had a net negative effect on the redistribution of wealth and power to 
poor areas because the poor, renters, and people of color are insufficiently repre-
sented in participatory processes. Fainstein & Hirst, supra note 29, at 109; see 
also Peter Marcuse, New York City's Community Boards: Neighborhood Policy and 
its Results, in NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY AND PROGRAMMES: PAST AND PRESENT 145 
(Naomi Carmon ed., 1990). See generally JEFFREY M. BERRY ET AL., THE REBIRTH 
OF URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993). 
U5 Participatory mechanisms have been acknowledged to be more effective at 
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that community not be included in economic development deci-
sion-making. 
When programs like the Empowerment Zones program 
force cities, at least on the surface, to seek citizen participation 
in economic development decision-making, the resulting partic-
ipation may still be exclusionary and not meaningful. The 
harmful aspects of purely instrumental motives are obscured 
by the use of seemingly methodical and objective participatory 
schemes informed by stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is 
often the implicit basis for conceiving and implementing citizen 
participation schemes.146 Stakeholder theory originates from 
corporate managerial decision-making models that seek to 
accurately describe the groups of people both inside and out-
side of a corporation who have a "stake" in the operations and 
decisions that a corporation makes. It considers "whether cor-
porations owe a duty of 'trusteeship' or 'responsibility' to other 
social interests besides those of the shareholders."147 Stake-
holder theory posits that corporate managers and shareholders 
are not the only group of people whose interests a corporation's 
performance can impact; instead, workers, consumers, suppli-
ers, creditors, and local communities have a stake in corporate 
decision-making. 148 The idea is that everyone who has a 
stake should be brought to the corporate decision-making table 
or, at the very least, their interests should be taken into con-
sideration. Therefore, stakeholder theory is a very useful con-
struct for deciding the question of who should participate in a 
decision-making process.149 Within the context of an urban 
retaining middle-class residents within the city than they are at promoting the 
interests of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Carmine Scavo, The Use of 
Participative Mechanisms in Large u.s. Cities, 15 J. DRB. AFFAIRS 93, 93-109 
(1993). 
1<6 See Severyn T. Bruyn, The Moral Economy, 57 REv. OF SOC. ECON. 25, 27 
(1999) (noting that stakeholder's theory offers a way to determine the common 
good that is otherwise continuously evolving). 
147 Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 21-22 (1992) ("The corporation should be man-
aged for the benefit of its stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, owners, employ-
ees, and local communities."); William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stake-
holder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 66, 
69-71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 5th ed. 1997). 
148 Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON 
L. REv. 197, 218 (1991). 
149 See William Beaver, Is the Stakeholder Model Dead? It Looks Like the People 
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development planning process, the relevant stakeholders would 
be local government, community-based non-profit organiza-
tions, community businesses, individual community residents, 
developers, financial intermediaries, and foundation represen-
tatives.ISO 
Stakeholder theory's premise of neutrality ultimately does 
not necessarily lead to meaningful community participation. 
Under stakeholder theory, "the decision-maker considers the 
views of all constituents with a stake in the process, without 
giving priority to the interests and benefits of any particular 
constituency.,,151 Stakeholder theory is based on the view that 
"ultimate values or ends are arbitrary and political and cannot 
be determined by rational analysis and thus they must be 
accepted as arbitrarily given through the political process."152 
Communities are often considered one of many stakeholders in 
the issues and decisions facing cities. Therefore, in the context 
of development, when there are competing goals of profit, equi-
ty, economic empowerment, quality of life, or possibly other 
goals, the stakeholder technique seemingly provides a rational 
means of synthesizing and prioritizing goals. To that end, 
stakeholder theory presumes that through discourse, a rational 
outcome beneficial to the participants and the public good will 
Who Hold the Shares are Still Number One in the Mind of Corporate America, 42 
Bus. HORIZONS 8, 12 (1999) (arguing that the hostile takeovers, downsizing, merg-
ers, rise in executive compensation through stock options, and the rise in institu-
tional investors have strengthened the primacy of the shareholder and largely 
rendered the stakeholder model meaningless in corporate America). 
150 See Ortwin Renn et aI., Public Participation in Decision-Making: A Three-
Step Procedure, 26 POL'Y SCIS. 189, 190-91 (1993) (proposing a participatory deci-
sion-making process utilizing three forms of knowledge: (1) knowledge based on 
common sense and personal experience, (2) knowledge based on technical expertise, 
and (3) knowledge derived from social interests and advocacy). 
151 See Georgette C. Poindexter, Addressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Rede-
velopment: Using Stakeholder Theory to Craft Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 
38 (1995). Compare this theory to the approach of equity planners, who believe 
the planners' role extends "beyond that of advocacy in making sure 
underrepresented voices are heard to that of giving planners the specific social 
responsibility of promoting redistribution where there is an imbalance of power 
and resources." Catherine Ross & Nancy Green Leigh, Planning, Urban Revitaliza-
tion, and the Inner City: An Exploration of Structural Racism, 14 J. OF PLANNING 
LITERATURE 367, 369 (Feb. 2000). They further believe that "having a voice is not 
enough. Instead specific efforts must be made to redress the imbalances of resourc-
es, opportunities, and power that contribute to the material and social inequities 
experienced by racial minorities." Id. at 369-70. 
152 Woller, supra note 140, at 88. 
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ensue. Fundamentally, this argument is based on an assump-
tion that all interests, when brought to the table, will be con-
sidered equally. Stakeholder theory does not adequately con-
sider, however, that the development process is weighted to-
wards protecting certain interests. To the extent that partici-
pants bring goals to the table that are inconsistent with the 
predefined and privatized goals of development, the process 
will either stop or the inconsistent goals will be discarded as 
irrational, impractical, or simply undesirable. 153 Therefore, 
instrumental justifications are inadequate for justifying com-
munity participation in economic development decision-mak-
ing. Perhaps, however, the greatest problem for instrumental 
theories in justifying participation as a goal is their over-reli-
ance on extrinsic justifications of bureaucratic rationality that 
fail to acknowledge the intrinsic value of community participa-
tion for the participants, regardless of efficient or rational 
outcomes. In addition, they fail to provide any reason at all to 
tolerate the messy elements of direct democracy that are im-
plicit in any participatory mandate. 
B. Democratic Political Theory and the Intrinsic Value of 
Participation 
The law and policy of community participation, while rhe-
torically ubiquitous, are largely undeveloped and inadequate. 
One of the most important aspects of community participation 
is that it typically involves some level of direct participation by 
community members in a decision-making process. While par-
ticipation of all residents of a particular community is physi-
cally impossible, and some form of representative scheme is re-
153 See Frank Fischer, Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy 
Expertise: From Theoretical Inquiry to Practical Cases, 26 POL'y SCIS. 165, 169-70 
(noting the mediating role that public administrators play between elites and the 
mass citizenry: regardless of the personal or moral intentions, public administra-
tors tend to buy into a system of explanations designed to accommodate the needs 
of community to the structures of a larger system of domination and control). Also, 
consider the case of the relationship of community groups with the Mayor of New 
York City. Very real constraints have been demonstrated to operate in that arena 
where participants are constrained from disagreeing or expressing an unpopular 
view for fear of defunding or other punitive actions in unrelated matters. There-
fore, local government retains significant power and discretion to shape the out-
come of participatory processes. 
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quired, all of the methods of participation utilized are based on 
a very decentralized form of decision-making predicated on 
garnering widespread input on decisions related to agenda-
setting and implementation. The direct democracy involved in 
a community participation scheme is of a different qualitative 
nature than the more familiar methods of direct democracy at 
the national and state level (such as the initiative and referen-
dum). Instead of an up or down vote of "yes" or "no," the na-
ture of direct democracy in community participation is based 
on the personal face-to-face form of discourse and negotiation. 
In many ways, this is the most direct analogue to the New 
England town meeting that often serves as the rhetorical jus-
tification for direct democracy and our normative vision of 
government. 154 
The rhetoric of direct democracy abounds in the justifica-
tions for both constitutional and political federalism. Power 
should devolve to state and local governments to provide as 
much local decision-making as possible, to let states serve as 
laboratories for innovation and experimentation, and to allow 
local control over decisions that are perceived to be primarily 
of local concern. As Gerald Frug has argued, one of the under-
lying influences on judicial decision-making with respect to 
issues of local government has to do with whether the court 
believes that decision-making is more appropriately centralized 
rather than decentralized.15s Although Frug has identified a 
tendency for courts to decide in favor of centralized decision-
making, he probably would not argue with the assertion that 
the rhetoric of local control and a defense of its benefits of 
flexibility and innovation forms a strong current in Supreme 
Court and other courts' jurisprudence in the recognition of a 
15. For example, the New England Town Meeting is often offered as the exam-
ple of direct democracy in action in North America. It meant that decisions were 
made collaboratively and directly involving face-to-face discussion, negotiation and 
compromise. Today's version of direct democracy, the up-or-down, yes-or-no vote at 
the ballot box, is a related but quite distinct form of direct democracy. See Philip 
P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democ-
racy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLIAMETl'E L. REv. 421, 429 
(1998) (noting that the consensus-based decision-making process of the New Eng-
land Town Meeting has little in common with the direct democracy of statewide 
ballot initiatives and referenda). 
155 See generally Gerald Frog, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 
253 (1993). 
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right to local control over criminal matters, zoning, and school 
finance. 15s Americans fundamentally believe, at least in the 
abstract, that local government is the level of government 
closest to the people and, wherever possible, that the people 
should have the ability to make decisions for themselves, or at 
least have their representatives, to whom they, in theory, have 
the most access, make the decisions for them. 
In spite of our belief in local input and control, Hannah 
Arendt made the important observation that Thomas Jefferson 
was concerned that the Constitution had been justified under 
the rhetoric of democracy but had left little actual space for the 
practice of democracy.157 According to Arendt, without the 
practice of democracy, Jefferson believed that the greater de-
mocracy itself was threatened because citizens would be ill-
trained for public decision-making.15s In keeping with 
Jefferson's concern about the rhetorical reverence for democrat-
ic principles in the abstract, the legal jurisprudence of direct 
democracy is otherwise sparse and under-developed because 
democracy is nevertheless envisioned as representative democ-
racy and participation is envisioned as voting on election 
day.159 In some ways, this puts direct democracy at odds with 
our predominant representative notions of democracy. As a 
result, no legally recognized or protected space exists for this 
form of decision-making because direct participation does not 
involve a formal system of elections of representative decision-
makers. 
156 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-31 
(1973) (reasoning that funding disparities in Texas' school system were not consti-
tutionally infirm especially in light of the Supreme Court tradition of deferring to 
local control of education); see also Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability 
of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 
WIS. L. REV. 83, 104-113, 118-119. 
157 HANNA ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 234-59 (1965). 
158 [d. at 258-59. 
159 See generally Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 
COLUM. L. REv. 312 (1997) (arguing that systems of lawmaking in representative 
government provide constructive participatory government through electoral coer-
cion and interest representation). 
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C. The Lack of Legally-Protected Space for Direct Democracy 
The system of government set forth in the United States 
Constitution is described as government for and by the people. 
The "people" form the touchstone for a government that is 
republican or representative-a small group of citizens are 
chosen by election to make public decisions, while the people 
are carefully relegated to a secondary or indirect form of deci-
sion-making.1so Democratic participation is provided for in 
the right to participate in the choice of decision-makers. These 
decision-makers are typically elite leaders who compete for the 
votes of the non-elite.161 Their responsiveness to the concerns 
of ordinary people is ensured through the risk of loss of reelec-
tion and pressure by active interest groups in between elec-
tions.162 Accordingly, constitutional law has focused heavily 
on ensuring the fairness of representative processes to protect 
political equality. Universal suffrage, freedom of expression, 
and the principle of "one person one vote" are the hallmark of 
the protection of the right to democratic participation. 
Direct participation has been primarily described and 
understood in its negative sense, however, through the well-
known warnings of James Madison. He urged ratification of 
the then-proposed U.S. Constitution based on the protection 
that its representative structure and system of checks and 
balances would provide against the dangers and evils of direct 
democracy. He wrote: 
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure de-
mocracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of 
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, 
can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction .... Hence it is that 
such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbUlence and con-
tention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or 
the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their 
lives as they have been violent in their deaths.l63 
160 Carol Pateman argues that representative theories of democracy establish a 
democratic ideal that is anti-democratic or anti-participation because such theories 
seek systemic stability by relying on the active participation of the minority elite 
and the non-participation of the apathetic, ordinary person. CAROL PATEMAN, PAR-
TICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 42, 104 (1970). 
161 Id. at 14. 
162 Id. 
1&3 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 (James Madison) (B.F. Wright ed., 1961). 
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From Madison's point of view, the chaos and dissension 
associated with direct participation were to be avoided at any 
cost. The threat they posed to private property, and thus to 
liberty, were intolerable, and meant that democratic participa-
tion should be structured into a remote system of represented 
government and a federal system premised upon checks and 
balances. Madison's views prevailed in the structuring of the 
U.S. system of government and thus were directly responsible 
for the contemporary understanding that participation be 
mainly representative and chiefly protective-to protect the 
individual's private interests and to provide protection against 
overreaching by elected leaders. 164 Most importantly, 
Madison's beliefs about human nature and the perils of un-
checked freedom and power were incorporated into our system 
of government and into our beliefs about the potential of de-
mocracy. It is important to note that Madison's republican 
notions of democracy sought to weight the democratic balance 
in favor of the liberty interests of property owners. Thus, his 
cautionary admonitions about the perils of direct democracy 
never really addressed the impact on the liberty of those at the 
bottom of the socio-economic scale. Nonetheless, because de-
mocracy is premised on equality and because guarantees of 
equality are designed to guarantee human flourishing and self-
actualization for all, the dangers of direct democracy do not 
justify its dismissal. 
The biggest push for direct democracy came from the Pro-
gressives, who at the turn of the century sought to shift politi-
cal decision-making on legislation to ordinary voters. Tech-
niques included several electoral devices such as direct pri-
maries, proportional representation, non-partisan elections, 
and the initiative, referendum, and recall.165 The initiative, 
Feferendum, and recall embody a very limited, if not crude, 
form of direct democracy because they involve "yes" or "no," 
one-shot decision-making. While this is probably the most 
suitable form of direct decision-making for mass participation, 
it has been strongly criticized and questioned for its failure to 
II;( See PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 14. 
165 See Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why 
the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. 
& POL'y REv. 11, 13 (1997). 
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educate voters adequately about the issues, its lack of protec-
tion for minority interests against majority interests, and its 
inability to correctly weigh the strength of voter concern or 
relative-disinterest in a particular issue.lss 
The common law jurisprudence of direct democracy, to the 
extent that it exists, is primarily contained in dicta in the 
areas of civil and criminal trial juries. Juries are generally 
regarded as a key democratic institution of the trial system 
and are considered to enhance participatory or direct democra-
cy.167 Courts often supportively preface a discussion of a jury 
trial by describing it as the one area of direct democracy in the 
judicial system.168 The jury is regarded, therefore, not as a 
judicial institution but rather as a political institution.169 The 
jury is viewed as a representative of the community that legiti-
mizes the justice system by including a representative cross-
section of all members of the community in the decision-mak-
ing process. As one judge has observed, "There can be no uni-
versal respect for law unless all Americans feel that it is their 
law-that they have a stake in making it work.,,170 Use of the 
jury has been under attack as judges and lawyers struggle over 
just how active or inactive a jury should be and just how in-
166 See generally Derrick Bell, The Referendum: DemQcracy's Barrier to Racial 
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of 
Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REv. 434 (1998). 
167 See Article, Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARv. L. REv. 
1421, 1423 (May 1997) (examining the jury as a "dispute resolution mechanism, an 
equitable weapon against tyranny, a legitimator of legal decisions, and an 
instantiation of democracy"); Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Partic-
ipation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 203, 204-06, 218-21 (1995) 
(analogizing jury participation rights with voting rights). See generally Herbert J. 
Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
19 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
168 See, e.g., Lirette v. Shiva Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (D. Mass. 1998) 
("Our willingness as a society to drift away from the use of civil juries reflects a 
failure in understanding of the jury's essential function in our American democra-
cy. The jury system is direct democracy at work. It is, in fact, the most vital 
expression of direct democracy in America. Today, it is the New England town 
meeting writ large, the people themselves governing."). 
169 Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "It would be a very narrow view to look 
upon a jury as a mere judicial institution. . . . The jury is, above all a political 
institution, and it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated." 
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282 (Henry Reeve trans., Francis 
Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds., 1993). 
170 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780·1860, at 
27·28 (1977). 
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volved it should be in a trial. This struggle is reflected in the 
increasingly common contractual waivers of right to a jury trial 
in agreements with business enterpnses. l71 
Notwithstanding the direct democratic threads identified 
above, our legal cognizance and understanding of democratic 
participation is primarily found in the right to vote. l72 Con-
temporary understandings of democratic participation, howev-
er, extend beyond the right to vote and recognize that decision-
making takes place in contexts other than elections for offi-
cials, one-shot referenda, or trials. Decisions about structuring 
and implementing urban development projects require more 
than a one-shot vote of "yes" or "no," and instead require dis-
course, collaboration, conflict resolution, implementation, and 
evaluation. The federal government has attempted to create a 
space for this kind of decision-making for ordinary citizens that 
has the potential to become a means of engaging in actual 
public policy decision-making at the local or neighborhood 
level. The jurisprudence of democracy, however, provides very 
little, if any, guidance about how to handle legal questions 
arising from the stepsister of representative democracy: Direct 
democracy. Direct democracy embodied in community partici-
pation mandates presents challenges to democratic jurispru-
dence because it moves beyond an individual right of one per-
son, one vote, to a collectively held, perceptible (yet precisely 
undefinable) community right of participation. To tolerate 
direct participation's slower and messier form of decision-mak-
ing, compelling explanations of participation's intrinsic value 
are required. Democratic political theory allows us to consider 
the benefits to community residents of community participa-
tion, and the benefits to the cities that must sponsor it, or at 
171 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1991) 
(upholding use of arbitration agreements enforceable in employment agreements); 
Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1157-59 (11th Cir. 1999) (inval-
idating arbitration clause in consumer financing agreement), rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 513, 
522-23 (2000) (reversing based on Randolph's failure to make any showing of pro-
hibitive costs in proceeding to arbitration). 
112 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-87 (1964) (recognizing the 
constitutional guarantee of one person, one vote principle under Equal Protection 
Clause). But see Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About 
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1709-20 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote 
involves not only the substantive function of participation but also aggregation of 
hldividual preferences and governance). 
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least allow it to take place. Thus, we may consider whether 
these intrinsic benefits are worth the inevitable tradeoffs in 
smoothness or efficiency. 
D. Direct Democratic Political Theory and the Intrinsic Value 
of Participation . 
Democratic political theory views direct participation as 
being important for three related but distinct reasons: partici-
pation is thought to promote egalitarianism, education, and 
self-transformation. First, direct citizen participation is impor-
tant for its intrinsic value of promoting egalitarian principles 
and human flourishing. It recognizes that human beings value 
those activities and processes that allow them to grow and 
develop.173 Therefore, participation is valuable for fulfilling 
innate and basic human developmental needs for agency and 
for living up to one's own potential. The notion of citizen par-
ticipation in its most general sense derives from a democratic 
concept that all people are equal in their decision-making abili-
ty and should have the right to participate in decision-making 
on matters or issues that directly or indirectly concern them or 
have an effect on their lives.174 Accordingly, based on his 
well-known observations of equal decision-making and self-
help practices employed by free, white male citizens in pre-
industrial, 1830s America, Alexis de Tocqueville regarded de-
centralized government, and its attendant freedom to directly 
participate in public decision-making, as an incredible produc-
er of energy and activity in the United States.175 In his view, 
the political advantages of direct participation outweigh the 
administrative advantages of more centralized government 
decision-making: 
173 Mark Warren, Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation, 86 AM. POL. SCI. 
REv. 8, 9 (Mar. 1992). 
17, Gerald Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 THE URBAN LAW. 
553, 560 (1987). 
175 DE TOCQUEVlLLE, supra note 168, at 261. The United States, as it then 
existed, was, in de Tocqueville's view, a democratic society. He made what is now 
clearly a contradictory observation: "In the United States, except for slaves, ser-
vants, and paupers supported by the towns, there is no class of persons who do 
not exercise the elective franchise, and who do not indirectly contribute to make 
the laws. Id. at 257. 
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Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government, 
but it produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable 
to create; namely an all-pervading and restless activity, a super-
abundant force, and an energy which is inseparable from it, and 
which may, however unfavorable circumstances may be, produce 
wonders.176 
Central to de Tocqueville's celebration of participation was the 
notion that public decision-making should incorporate plural-
ism and thus should be directed by multiple viewpoints, rather 
than a centralized governmental entity.177 
Of course, not all democratic political theories advocate 
direct participation. Most democratic political theory presumes 
that participation should take place at the ballot box in a re-
publican form of government.178 By contrast, a smaller collec-
tion of democratic theories posit that the basic, yet crucial, 
process of participation is citizens themselves being involved in 
priority-setting, as well as decision-making, dialogue and delib-
eration.179 "Participatory politics deals with public disputes 
and conflicts of interest by subjecting them to a never-ending 
process of deliberation, decision, and action. "180 At the heart 
of this strong democratic theory is "democratic talk," which is 
more than mere speech: "It refers both to human discourse and 
interaction using both language and linguistic symbols.,,181 
According to Benjamin Barber, strong democratic talk serves 
nine functions: it allows "the articulation of interests; bargain-
ing and exchange; persuasion; agenda-setting; exploring mutu-
ality; affiliation and affection; maintaining autonomy; witness 
and self-expression; reformulation and re-conceptualization; 
176 [d. at 261.62. 
177 de Tocqueville wrote, "It is not always feasible to consult the whole people, 
either directly or indirectly, in the formation of the law; but it cannot be denied 
that, when this is possible, the authority of the law is greatly increased." [d. at 
256; see also Ross & Leigh, supra note 150, at 368 ("Implicit in the theory of 
advocacy planning is the idea of pluralism: that the planning process should be 
guided by multiple viewpoints and entities, rather than by the technical staff of a 
central planning agency."). 
178 See generally SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: 
POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972). 
179 One of the most prominent of such direct democratic theories is Barber's 
theory of strong democracy. BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATO· 
RY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 132 (1984). 
180 [d. at 151. 
181 See id. at 173. 
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community-building as the creation of public interests, common 
goods, and active citizens."lS2 
1. The Power of Discourse: Self-Development, Self-
Transformation, and Interdependence 
The major function and effect of participation for propo-
nents of democratic theory is an educative one.l83 Direct par-
ticipation provides certain educational benefits and fosters cer-
tain psychological attitudes that are valuable to the person and 
to the society. Participation therefore serves as a learning 
process that educates citizens with the skills needed to sustain 
democracy. 1M This can be an education in how to negotiate a 
political process and create a sense of political effective-
ness.1SS Under this approach, national or statewide represen-
tative institutions are an insufficient form of democracy. Such 
national or statewide institutions involve "electoral competition 
between elites [that] deprives non-elites of access to conditions 
of their own development. "186 
The educational effects of direct participation and strong 
democratic talk extend beyond political effectiveness. Demo-
cratic participatory theory is premised on profound arguments 
of self-development, indeed, self-transformation. Participation 
is thought to foster important individual attitudes and psycho-
logical qualities that develop in spheres small enough to allow 
direct participation, such as the workplace, the neighborhood, 
the school board, and local government.1S7 It promises to pro-
182 Id. at 173. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOC-
RACY (1980). 
183 PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 31-33. 
1M See Jane Mansbridge, Does Participation Make Better Citizens?, 5 THE GoOD 
SOC'y 3, 3-4 (Spring 1995) ("Participation does make better citizens. I believe it, 
but I can't prove it. And neither can anyone else."); see also Karen Stenner-Day & 
Mark Fischle, The Effects of Political Participation on Political Efficacy: A Simulta-
neous Equations Model, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 282, 302-03 (1992) (noting 
the absence of studies investigating the perceptions of political participation on 
individuals' perceptions of political efficacy and arguing that conventional forms of 
participation, such as partisan and community activism, do serve an educative and 
developmental function which mitigates against resort to extreme political behav-
ior, but lessens confidence in the responsiveness of the political regime). 
185 See PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 32. 
186 Warren, supra note 172, at 9. 
187 See PATE~IAN, supra note 159, at 42-43; Warren, supra note 172, at 8. 
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vide experiences that make people "more public-spirited, more 
tolerant, more knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests 
of others, and more probing of their own interests."l88 During 
a participatory process, the individual is thought to learn that 
one "has to take into account wider matters than [one's] own 
immediate private interests ... to gain cooperation from oth-
ers, and . . . learn[] that the public and private interest are 
linked. l89 Participationists conceive of people at their best 
and then seek a politically institutionalized form of direct de-
mocracy "to help them become better than they are."l90 
The transformational benefits of participation extend be-
yond the individual to the greater community and are quite 
profound. Participation brings about an awareness of interde-
pendence.191 Moreover, participatory deliberation and action 
educates people to see their common interests, and therefore, 
community grows out of participation.192 Accordingly, demo-
cratic political theory promises to further individual autonomy 
through the process of dialogue, bargaining, challenge, compro-
mise, and consensus building.193 Autonomy develops through 
interactions with other people and through learning about 
their unique capacities, problems, and interests, which allows 
people to "distinguish the wants, desires, and commitments 
that lend coherence to their identity from the wants, desires, 
and commitments that they have, perhaps uncritically, accept-
ed from their culture and may experience as a source of unhap-
piness. "194 
188 Warren, supra note 172, at 8. 
189 PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 25. 
190 BARBER, supra note 178, at 25. 
191 ~[T)he participatory process ensures that although no man, or group, is mas-
ter of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject to the 
law." PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 27. 
192 BARBER, supra note 178, at 152. According to Carol Pateman, these commu-
nity building effects are premised on a basic economic equality because "there is 
no disruptive division between rich and poor" as well as "the experience of partici-
pation in decision-making itself [that) attaches the individual to his society and is 
instrumental in developing it into a true community." PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 
27. 
193 PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 12. 
194 Id. 
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2. Critiquing the Self-Transformation Basis for 
Participation 
There are a number of problems, however, with the 
participation theory's promise of self-transformation. The first 
is what types, if any, of conflicting interests are transformable 
into common interests?195 While the promised benefits of par-
ticipation are logically premised on social interdependency, 
such interdependencies may not always be sufficient to trans-
form conflicting interests into common or mutual interests.19S 
For example, during the organizing or participatory phase of 
the Empowerment Zone program, the process illustrated that 
battles of governance and priorities were, in fact, battles over 
scarce goods. Only a certain number of people could participate 
in the decision-making, and even with mediation of some sort, 
these conflicting interests could not be transformed into com-
mon interests.197 Therefore, participation's self-transforma-
tion thesis must more clearly delineate the different types of 
interests and their differing potential for commonality, conflict, 
and transformation.19s 
Another shortcoming of participation theory is its advocacy 
of talk and process for community building or as being univer-
sally beneficial.199 This is problematic because process de-
195 Id. at 14; see also IRIs MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with author) (examining the norms and conditions for 
inclusive democratic communication under circumstances of structural inequality 
and cultural difference). 
196 PATEMAN, supra note 159, at 14. Clearly, social interdependencies do not 
necessarily reflect mutual interests. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 162, 
at 77; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY xiv (John Grayed., 1991) (noting that 
democratic society does not always protect individual and minority liberty and that 
the people have many conflicting interests, faiths, and beliefs). 
191 Warren, supra note 172, at 14 (arguing that impersonal mechanisms like 
mediation rather than transformation are called for). 
Id. 
198 Id. 
199 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 162, at 133. Madison wrote: 
Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, 
have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equali-
ty in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly 
'equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their 
passions. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme 
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises 
the cure for which we are seeking. 
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pends on context. Participation theory could be enhanced if it 
could account for the different types of settings in which suc-
cessful consensus building and decision-making take place.200 
Consider: Can the mass participation community meeting, 
where everyone is welcome to participate, be equated with the 
types of places where participatory decision-making successful-
ly takes place? For example, in settings such as voluntary 
organizations, school, the workplace, friendship, child rearing, 
and other consensual settings, conflict may be the exception 
rather than the rule, and when conflict does arise, it may be 
resolved simply by reaffirming common interests.201 Partici-
patory theory resonates with us because we know these trans-
formations can and do happen, at least on an individual level. 
The types of settings are usually ones where trust has formed, 
and a desire to preserve relationships exists, and therefore, the 
setting makes agreement on a common goal or purpose possi-
ble. No one has quite figured out, however, how to mandate 
creation of these institutions of trust that will allow such 
transformations to take place. Therefore, where these and 
other commonalities have not been established, and where the 
setting is other than the ones described above, social relations 
are still inherently political with little possibility of remedy. 
3. Participation Theory's Marginalization of Subor-
dinated Identities and Difference 
Differences in race and class also lessen strong 
democracy's self-transformation promise. Resulting differences 
in positional and status goods such as access to jobs, housing, 
and education, also affect participation's ability to meet its 
self-transformation promise.202 Dialogue under these circum-
stances may heighten conflict by highlighting injustices and 
differences in class, culture, and identity.203 For example, 
200 Jane Mansbridge, Unitary & Adversary: The Two Forms of Democracy, 7 IN 
CONTEXT 10 1984, available at Context Institute, http://www.context.orglICLIBIIC-
07lMansbridg.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (arguing that it is important to 
distinguish between the democracy of friends based on equal respect and the de-
mocracy of citizens based on equal rights). 
201 Warren, supra note 172, at 14. 
202 ld. 
203 See generally Howell S. Baum, Ethical Behavior is Extraordinary Behavior; 
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case studies illustrate the tension between race and class in 
planning.204 Direct democratic participation may also fail in 
traversing these differences and in building community in a 
smaller context. Jane Mansbridge, in particular, has critiqued 
the community building rationale as a justification for partici-
pation, arguing that her research showed that small communi-
ties tend to operate by norms that silence those who disagree 
and encourage agreement to preserve social ties, even where 
there is legitimate reason for disagreement.205 
4. The Limits of Discourse and Participation 
Participation's reliance on argument or discourse is also 
problematic. Providing a mechanism for presenting a variety of 
viewpoints through the medium of argument assumes that the 
best viewpoint will be adopted once the viewpoints are offered 
for consideration.206 But discourse usually marginalizes those 
who do not talk or those who talk in marginalized ways. For 
example, an ethnographic study of a rural planning process 
found that farmers trying to oppose development were 
marginalized in the process because of their discursive 
styles.207 In particular, dominant organizational, ideological, 
and discursive forms predominated and dis empowered ordinary 
citizens in public meetings. For instance, local conventions for 
decision-making on land uses were personal, ad hoc, individu-
alistic, and moralistic, and advocated granting special consider-
It's the Same as All Other Behavior, 64 J. AM. PLAN. AsSN 411 (Sept. 1998). 
2~ Ross & Leigh, supra note 150, at 372-77 (discussing role of race and class in 
zoning, brownfield redevelopment, and thwarted mass transportation systems). 
205 Mansbridge, supra note 181, at 166-71. 
20(; Two commentators note, however, that there is a difference between support-
ers and opponents of a particular decision. See Lee Clarke & William R. 
Freudenburg, Rhetoric, Reform, and Risk: Public Participation in Policy Decisions, 
30 SOC'V 78, 79 (1993). Supporters make up their minds early in the process and 
are uninterested in new information. Opponents actively search for new informa-
tion because they are interested only in supporting their position. Id. at 79-80. 
Therefore, the best viewpoint is not necessarily adopted. Instead opponents are 
likely to have the upper hand because argument becomes the medium through 
which they advance their interests. Id. at 81. This notion of supporters and oppo-
nents reveals another grave shortcoming of direct democracy in the context of 
today's society. Id. at 82. 
207 Warren, supra note 172, at 15. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE 
AND PUNISH: THE BmTH OF THE PRIsON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). 
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ations to individuals for personal reasons.20B This contrasted 
sharply with the bureaucratic rationality of public officials, 
developers, and attorneys, which emphasized consistent en-
forcement of a comprehensive plan-bureaucratic treatment of 
all persons according to the same rules.209 Local residents 
whose interests development threatened most-local farmers 
and ranchers whose lands would be strip-mined-tended to use 
the local style so that their voices systematically carried less 
weight in the formal planning process.210 This happens be-
cause the views of the marginalized threaten to transform the 
entire discourse from its pre-determined ends-i.e., if one actu-
ally allowed them to participate, they might transform the 
whole agenda. So, if participation theory really could come up 
with a model that could take into account the views of the 
people who were marginalized, the promised transformation 
would indeed be authentic and profound, but the transforma-
tion would not be self-transformation but rather outer trans-
formation of the processes and circumstances that affect their 
lives. 
E. Are We Ready to Embrace Conflict? 
The self-transformation promise of democratic participato-
ry theory is based on human nature at its best and embraces 
conflict without acknowledging our extreme discomfort with 
conflict. As a result, the promise of self-transformation fails to 
provide a sustainable justification for inclusion of poor black 
community residents in an expert-driven process like develop-
ment, particularly when it slows down the process and injects 
dissension, uncertainty, or views and ideas that are otherwise 
considered marginal. Participation is ill-equipped to cope with 
the real or perceived differences between people. People's inter-
208 Caroline S. Tauxe, Marginalizing Public Participation in Local Planning: An 
Ethnographic Account, 61 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 471, 473-74 (Sept. 1995). 
209 See id. at 477. 
210 Tauxe notes that "throughout this planning process, both developers and 
government agents publicly hailed the ideal of citizen and community participation 
in impact mitigation and development planning, while the legal and procedural 
apparatus . . . and the cultural predisposition of local elites to support changes 
they associated with 'progress,' in combination, prevented such participation from 
posing any serious threat to the developers' plans." [d. at 475. 
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ests may not always make talk satisfying, useful, or meaning-
ful as a justification for direct participation. In many senses, 
participation is based to a certain extent on an embrace of 
conflict because it believes that conflict can be resolved 
through dialogue and negotiation. 
On the other hand, direct participation reveals conflict 
that leads to a profound sense of social disruption that people 
try to avoid. As the Model Cities and Empowerment Zones 
participatory experience demonstrated, the specter of delay, 
dissension, and chaos is appropriately associated with partici-
pation. It is important to consider that "people care deeply 
about social disruption." As one commentator has observed, 
"Social disruptions concerning community structure and ethos, 
hopes and expectations for family futures, institutional legiti-
macy, and collective responsibility are hard to measure for two 
reasons. First, they yield no body counts and, second, however 
valuable, markets have trouble pricing them." Participation 
theory provides no guidance to government or policymakers on 
how to appropriately gauge or balance the need for conflict and 
the concerns of those who dislike it. The tendency, perhaps 
understandable, is usually to avoid it. 
Adding to the cautionary impact of Madison's perspective, 
our privatized notions of economic matters, our private lives, 
and our distrust of non-expert decision-making are also so 
ingrained and so rooted in fear of "the Other" that we are un-
able to acknowledge it aloud, let alone to ourselves. Therefore, 
we are left with near-universal generalized support for partici-
pation but little stomach for what it takes to follow through on 
that support. As a result, many participatory schemes are 
either too broad or too narrow, implemented too late, or re-
quired to take place so rapidly that they are doomed to be 
ineffective, alienating, and counter-productive. Instrumental 
theories are similarly, if not more so, unsatisfying. Not only 
does participation as a means to an end use people as tools in 
a misleading way, it assumes that government can employ 
neutral tactics and obtain a fair result even in the face of sig-
nificant hierarchies of power. These power arrangements prom-
ise to always resolve conflicts of interests against the interests 
and desires of poor community residents. Therefore, a theoreti-
cal justification for participation seems like it should have a 
way to account for conflicts of interest in a way that those who 
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are marginalized, those whose discourse may not always equip 
them to participate to their own benefit in a participatory 
process, are able to get something for their time and effort.211 
In other words, participation needs a substantive justification 
other than efficiency or process. It needs a basis that sets an 
explicit and unapologetic goal. 
F. Participation for Empowerment and Community Control 
Another set of arguments in favor of participation justify 
citizen or community involvement as a means to political and 
economic empowerment. These arguments believe that without 
power to make decisions, participation is a meaningless exer-
cise that does not result in any tangible benefits to the commu-
nity. Here, the argument for participation is explicitly connect-
ed to a concept of justice and political efficacy that, taken to its 
natural ends, explicitly seeks decision-making power for a 
particular community. 
This argument was most strongly advocated during the 
1960s and 1970s, following the gains of the Civil Rights Move-
ment in the South and the frustration in Northern city ghettos 
that civil rights had left no impact on the conditions of discrim-
ination, segregation, and poverty.212 Under this view, par-
ticipation is a group right carried out by individuals on behalf 
of the groUp.213 Political control under the era's rubric of 
Black Power for black ghetto communities was an overt goal of 
211 Box, supra note 127, at 15. 
212 See CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 65-66. See generally LAWRENCE J. HANKS, 
THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN THREE GEORGIA COUNTIES 
(1987); see also RICHARD A. KEISER, SUBORDINATION OR EMPOWERMENT? AFRICAN-
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN POLITICAL POWER 5-7 
(1993). Keiser wrote: 
Empowerment is a process by which a minority group or representatives 
of that minority group gain a greater ability to influence political out-
comes in favor of the minority group. . . . [This) can be measured by 
analyzing the minority group's success in capturing important offices, 
instituting policies that are high on the group's agenda and meeting 
resistance from established groups, [while) securing miscellaneous benefits 
that other groups also desire. 
[d. at 6-7. 
213 See generally Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 
STAN. L. REv. 923 (1984) (describing a typology of individualist versus organicist 
theories). 
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black communities, activists, and public intellectuals.214 
Black Power as a theme for the black movement departed from 
the integrationist ideal of the Civil Rights Movement and em-
phasized instead "the autonomy of the black ghetto as a basis 
of cultural identity, social and political organization, and power 
for blacks."215 While the Black Power movement theoretically 
sought a fundamental reordering or redefinition of social and 
economic structures to end racial and economic subordination, 
the dominant energy of the movement was directed towards 
attempting to "maximize the political clout of blacks within the 
existing structures [rather than] redefining and recreating 
those structures themselves. "216 Empowerment was conceived 
of in a way that extended beyond mere inclusion of the poor: 
instead, empowerment ideally meant that a community would 
have control of all governmental dollars spent on behalf of the 
community. This position was influenced in part by the exis-
tence of the Community Action, and later by the Model Cities 
programs that channeled some of the political struggles into 
struggles for control and composition of managing boards. This 
claim was also shaped, in part, by the unresponsiveness of 
municipal bureaucracies to the interests, concerns, and needs 
of inner-city black communities. Therefore, the black power 
theme was a call for municipal reform through devolution of 
power to neighborhoods to make decisions on its own behalf. 
21< Arnstein, supra note 1, at 335, 336; see also JOHN T. MCCARTNEY, BLACK 
POWER IDEOLOGIES: AN ESSAY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT. ch. 7 
(1992) (discussing belief that black progress depends upon blacks controlling their 
own destiny). It continues to have resonance for some critical race theorists as 
well. See, e.g., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARl J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go 
BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 22-23, 101-02 (1997) (arguing 
that the original concept of affirmative action was community control over govern-
mental and economic resources spent for or within black communities); Gary 
Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 792-93 (illustrating the Black 
Power claim by favorably distinguishing a formal demand for racial and geographic 
separatism from the call to nationalism) Peller argues that the exclusion of a 
nationalist approach to racial justice from mainstream discourse has been a cultur-
al and political mistake that has constrained the boundaries of racial politics. 
Peller, supra, at 793. 
21S CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 66-67. 
210 JAMES JENNINGS, THE POLITICS OF BLACK EMPOWERMENT 38, 102 (1992). 
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1. Ranking Participatory Methods: The "Ladder of 
Participation" 
In the late 1960s, Sherry Arnstein217 devised an influen-
tial model of participation that appeared to echo the claims for 
black power. Writing on behalf of "have-not blacks, Mexican-
Americans, Puerto Ricans, Indians, Eskimos and whites," her 
model divided the different forms that participation most often 
used in federal social programs at the time according to a con-
tinuum of involvement she termed a "ladder of participa-
tion.,,21s The "ladder" evaluated and ranked participatory 
mechanisms based on the type and degree of participation as 
"non-participation," "token participation," and "citizen power." 
In the model, the lowest rungs of the ladder of participation 
were assigned to forms of non-participation described as 
manipulation,219 therapy,220 and informing.221 These all in-
217 Arnstein had been a consultant to federal agencies wrestling with new strat-
egies for citizen participation and, at the time of publication of her article, was 
chief citizen participation advisor to the Model Cities Administration. Arnstein, 
supra note 1, at 335. 
218 Arnstein acknowledged that there could have been 150 rungs to properly 
account for the actual variety of participation. Id. at 340. 
219 Arnstein's example of manipulation is organizing a rubber-stamp advisory 
committee when a few representatives of the poor are placed on public boards; 
this is token or meaningless participation. Id. Arnstein was probably referring to 
urban renewal. 
220 During the 1960s and early 1970s, a popular social work approach to partici-
pation was to offer therapy to poor black residents to cure them of pathologies 
that prevented them from adapting to their environment and perpetuated their 
social and material degradation. See, e.g., Shanti K Khinduka, Community Devel-
opment: Potentials and Limitations, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN COM-
MUNITY 396 (Roland L. Warren & Larry Lyon eds., 5th ed. 1988) (defining commu-
nity development as, among other things, a process of attempting to "educate and 
motivate people for self-help" as well as "enable people to establish and maintain 
cooperative and harmonious relationships"). 
This now discredited approach sounds similar to contemporary justifications of 
community development that view therapeutic approaches as a predicate for col-
lective action to improve communities. See Patricia A Wilson, Empowerment: Com-
munity Economic Development from the Inside Out, 33 URBAN STUD. 617, 622 
(1996). Such approaches may be theoretically right, but, in application, the pater-
nalistic emphases are apparent. Conditions of poverty are merely seen as individu-
al limitations and failure and not as a rational reaction to the deprivations and 
conditions under which some people are forced to live. 
This self-help approach becomes even more problematic when it becomes part 
of a government program. For example, Paolo Friere is credited with the concept 
of liberatory education and conscientization for Latin American peasants. See gen-
erally PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 137-38 (Myra Bergman Ramos 
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volved forms of one-way or instrumental communication in 
which government sought participants' views or attempted to 
act upon citizens without giving them a real voice. She as-
signed "token" forms of participation-consultation222 or what 
Arnstein termed as placation-to the middle tier of the lad-
der.223 Arnstein placed the most desirable forms of participa-
tion-those that involved exercises of "citizen power"-at the 
top of the ladder. Within this preferred tier, participatory ac-
tivities were ranked in order of least preference: partner-
ship,224 delegated power,225 and citizen control. According to 
trans., 1970). As a radical pedagogical tool, Friere's contributions have been invalu-
able. But for some reason, Friere's work has been very attractive to official gov-
ernmental agencies. In the hands of these bureaucratic agencies, the liberatory and 
oppositional elements of the pedagogical project have been lost in a routinization 
and watering down of the pedagogy until it looks curiously like therapy. See 
Thomas Heaney, Freirean Literacy in North America: The Community-Based Edu-
cation Movement (June 20, 1995), available at National-Louis University, Thresh-
olds in Education, http://nlu.nl.eduiacelResourcesIDocumentslFreireIssues.html (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2001) (arguing same). 
221 Informing as participation is self-explanatory-citizens are told of their rights 
and options. Obviously, information can be an important first step in participation, 
but if nothing else follows, such participation is of limited value. Arnstein, supra 
note 1, at 343. 
222 Consultation-citizen ideas are solicited through surveys, neighborhood meet-
ings, and public hearings. Arnstein, supra note 1, at 344. For example, community 
members in a Baltimore neighborhood complained to the author of being asked 
regularly for letters of support for projects in their neighborhood even though they 
had no input in the planning or design. Obtaining residents' signatures on letters 
of support allowed developers to say the community played a role. 
Yet, Arnstein's dismissal of consultation is a bit overstated to the extent she 
ignores the fact that this form of participation can serve as an initial leverage 
point in some circumstances. It is important, however, that she spoke so strongly 
on this point because her description illustrates strongly that consultation should 
never be mistaken as a preferred means of participation. 
223 Arnstein's use of the term "placation" essentially explains what she means 
by token participation: participation is merely for purposes of releasing a potential 
pressure valve of political opposition by providing a limited and truncated role for 
poor black citizens. Id. at 345-46 . 
. 224 Partnership exists when citizens share planning and decision-making respon-
sibilities through joint policy boards with mechanisms for resolving impasse. At 
this level, power can be redistributed through negotiation between community and 
decision-makers. According to Arnstein, the community often holds sufficient cards 
or influence and thus is sought out by the decision-makers for negotiation. Id. at 
349. Although she did not specify what influence this was, one can imagine that 
ability to delay a time-sensitive project is the most likely form of influence be-
cause in land development, the old adage "time is money" is very strong. 
225 "Delegated power" exists where the community has dominant decision-making 
authority over a particular plan or program, and "citizen control" exists where 
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Arnstein, participation was only meaningful to the extent that 
it involved the following: 
[T]he redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, 
presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be 
deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the 
have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and 
policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated 
and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, 
it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform 
which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent soci, 
ety.226 
In short, participation is meaningful only to the extent that 
one has the power to affect the outcom~ of the development 
process. 
2. The Limits of the Community Empowerment Claim 
In some ways, Arnstein's insight and the quest for Black 
Power must be viewed within the context out of which they 
arose. The late 1960s were a period of social unrest and high 
hopes for new social possibilities. An explicit claim of a need 
for power made sense in many regards. Blacks had been politi-
cally disenfranchised in the cities.227 The white exodus in the 
suburbs was underway but was only beginning to alter the 
balance of power in terms of voting strength.228 The impact of 
local electoral districting practices on diluting minority voting 
strength were beginning to be addressed.229 Municipal gov-
participants or residents govern a program or institution, are in charge of policy 
and management, and can negotiate any attempts at change by outsiders. [d. at 
351. 
226 [d. at 337-38. Arnstein acknowledged the overly simplified duality of dividing 
the world into the haves and have-nots, but asserted that "the have-nots really do 
perceive the powerful as a monolithic 'system,' and power holders actually do view 
the have-nots as a sea of 'those people.' " Arnstein, supra note 1, at 339-40. 
2ZI See MaRONE, supra note 30, at 191. 
228 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Dele· 
gations, Racial Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 134 (1992) 
(discussing shifts in the balance of power in southern cities when blacks began to 
outnumber whites). 
229 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1975) 
(holding that annexation of majority white suburbs by a racially mixed city satis-
fies the Voting Rights Act of 1965 where the city maintains a "ward" method 
voting system); Perkins v. Mathews, 400 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1971) (holding that mu-
nicipal annexations that have the capacity to dilute black voting strength within 
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ernment was notoriously unresponsive to black communi-
ties.230 Racial discrimination in housing and employment 
was, for all intents and purposes, unchecked.231 Urban renew-
al had destroyed black neighborhoods to such an extent that it 
was nicknamed "Negro Removal." Blacks were at the mercy of 
those with disproportionate power. It was clear that without 
power, they would continue to be. 
Outside of this context, it is easy to argue that Arnstein's 
emphasis on power and control claims too much. Her notion of 
empowerment seems to be premised on the notion that empow-
erment of one group takes place at the expense of another. 
Today, it seems unrealistic to demand that government hand 
over power to communities to plan and operate government 
services.232 The extent to which such a claim was made with-
in the context of the civil and social unrest during the 1960s 
further limits the current viability of calling for citizen power 
and control. The Civil Rights Movement, along with urban ri-
ots/rebellions, welfare rights movements, and other such move-
ments, provided an urban social movement behind the claim 
for citizen power. Today, that claim does not have the reinforc-
ing social organization behind it. Of course, much urban activi-
ty has been channeled into neighborhood-specific, community 
development corporations that have taken on a major role as 
the actors at the local level that seek to fill the gaps in afford-
able housing and retail services. Studies have shown that 
while these self-help organizations are radical in one sense 
(because they are willing to take on problems in neighborhoods 
that are understood in the popular urban imagination to be 
beyond hope and barren of resources), they are mainly conser-
vative in that they channel their activity into existing federal 
and foundation programs.233 This fact supports Manuel 
the city constitutes changes in voting practices within the scope of the Act}. 
230 See MORONE, supra note 30, at 191. 
231 As discussed earlier, one of the impetuses for the Gray Areas prograDl and 
the Community Action prograDl was the unresponsiveness of municipal bureau-
cracies to the needs of poor black communities and their residents. See supra text 
accompanying note 192. 
232 But see Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 
DUKE L.J. 75, 77, 90-94, 96 (1998) (proposing a "block improvement district" gov-
erned by property owners to supplement city services). 
233 See Randy Stoecker, The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique 
and an Alternative, 19 J. URB. AFF. 1, 7-8 (1997) (critiquing CDCs for ceasing to 
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Castells' observation that urban social movements fail over the 
long term because once the fight is over, their energies are 
turned to administrative and managerial struggles of trying to 
balance the books and deliver services efficiently.234 
The other limitation of the citizen power claim is its "geo-
graphical situatedness" -it locates the source of a citizen's 
interest and power within the confines of his or her communi-
ty. In fact, the poor black neighborhood is viewed as an auton-
omous, self-sustaining unit capable of articulating and protect-
ing the interests of its residents. It equates community control 
of decisions with community control of conditions within neigh-
borhoods.235 Therefore it treats the problems as internally, 
rather than externally, driven and ignores what has happened 
to these neighborhoods in the ensuing thirty-odd years. Indeed, 
continued globalization has relocated manufacturing to the 
southern United States and the Third World; decentralization 
of the metropolitan area has taken jobs and retail services 
from central cities, and last but not least, middle class and 
affluent people have moved the peripheries of the metropolitan 
area such that there are now new urban areas called exurbs 
and other urban areas called edge cities.236 This approach 
might have had a glimmer of hope when segregation locked all 
be authentically community based as they have become corporatized and staffed by 
professionals from outside the community and their work is mostly technical and 
administrative delivery of housing services); see also Ram A. Cnaan, Neighborhood-
Representing Organizations: How Democratic Are They?, 1991 SOC. SERVo REV. 614, 
616 (Dec. 1991) (noting the influence of the iron law of oligarchy in NROs that 
leads to a discrepancy between the potential and actual level of democracy in 
those organizations). 
m CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 103. On a macro level, Castells also opines that 
urban social movements are doomed in their quest to fight to define the meaning 
of the city because they are unable to offer an alternative system of production to 
capitalism. CASTELLS, supra note 17, at 103. 
23S See generally, NORMAN FAINSTEIN & SUSAN FAINSTEIN, URBAN POLITICAL 
MOVEMENTS: THE SEARCH FOR POWER BY MINORITY GROUPS IN AMERICAN CITIES 
(1974); JOHN HALL FISH, BLACK POWER, WHITE CONTROL: THE STRUGGLE OF THE 
WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION IN CHICAGO (1973); JOI-IN REx & ROBERT MOORE, RACE, 
COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT: A STUDY OF SPARKBROOK (1967). When one talks about 
a community that will be affected by a particular development project, one has 
hard, perhaps indeterminable, questions to answer about which is the relevant 
community. For instance, who are the proper representatives of the community? 
What if the representatives are often self-appointed and self-selected? These are 
the exceedingly difficult questions that must be faced in designing a participatory 
scheme and that are unanswered by political control theories. 
236 See generally JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1991). 
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classes together, but not today. 
The idea of the inner-city neighborhood as a politically 
autonomous entity also has implications for the rest of the city. 
For instance, should all neighborhoods have political control of 
development and other financial decisions with respect to their 
neighborhoods? Will not the more affluent neighborhoods do 
better under these schemes if they are able to retain their 
resources for their own needs? This has already started to take 
place, to a certain extent, with the rise of home ownership 
associations as a form of neighborhood organization and the 
proliferation of special benefits districts that provide enhanced 
services to city neighborhoods.237 The neighborhoods that are 
being left behind in these new subunits of local government 
are, more often than not, the poor black neighborhoods. 
Therefore, empowerment of these communities as economically 
flourishing or politically powerful units does not seem to be a 
viable endeavor. 
3. The Subtle Logic of Empowerment Through Resistance 
Arnstein's argument was more limited, however. She 
sought only to move past the rhetoric supporting participation 
and demonstrate that there were different levels of desirable 
participation.238 She also acknowledged that the typology 
overly simplified the matter and did not address the most 
significant obstacles to achieving genuine levels of participa-
tion. Arnstein wrote: 
On the power holders' side, they include racism, paternalism, and 
resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots' side, they in-
clude inadequacies of the poor community's political and socioeco-
nomic infrastructure and knowledge-base, plus difficulties of orga-
nizing a representative and accountable citizens' group in the face of 
futility, alienation and distrust.239 
In other words, Arnstein's typology sets a normative goal for 
participation-citizen-power-but does not take on the task of 
prescribing how to get there, particularly in the face of seem-
ingly insurmountable obstacles. Therefore, Arnstein's typology 
237 See Ellickson, supra note 231, at 96-98. 
238 Arnstein, supra note 1, at 339. 
2311 Id. at 340. 
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has a more subtle logic that can be lost in its otherwise strong 
claim that meaningful participation involves a redistribution of 
power. Arnstein's typology is based on an innate understand-
ing that participation inevitably leads to a power shift. If you 
include non-elites, the non-powerful, and the non-educated in 
an elite and expert-driven process like development, and struc-
ture the decision-making such that their views are taken into 
account, you are in effect giving them significant power. In 
fact, you threaten to disrupt the process because it is possible 
that the new participants wiII claim that the agenda should be 
changed in ways that it otherwise would not be. This is a sig-
nificant shift in, and exercise of, power. Therefore, if we apply 
Arnstein's logic today, what she seems to be saying is that 
participation inevitably leads to either a shift in power or to 
exclusion. And exclusion is more likely a natural or inevitable 
result because a shift in power so clearly threatens to disrupt 
an otherwise settled, and often privatized, process. 
To better understand this argument, reconsider the case of 
the AWC in Philadelphia's Model Cities Program discussed in 
Romney. Romney was discussed earlier as an example of the 
limits of litigation as an enforcement mechanism.24o But if we 
look further into the case, it illustrates another compeIIing 
point. As discussed above, the dispute in the court of appeals 
was whether AWC had been improperly excluded from being 
consulted on a decision on which it had a right, as the citizen 
participation arm of the program, to be consulted. The court of 
appeals concluded that both the City's and HUD's familiarity 
with AWC's views did not excuse them from consulting with 
AWC about specific major changes. The court further observed 
that "the issue is not citizen veto or even approval, but citizen 
participation, negotiation, and consultation in the major deci-
sions which are made for a particular Model Cities Pro-
gram."241 Local citizens were required to be consulted with 
respect to changes in the city's proposed program. 
One has to wonder what kind of meaningful consultation 
could have taken place at that late date when AWC was finaIIy 
reinstated. But the power of consultation in the context of the 
Model Cities program, with a legal guarantee and the ability to 
2<0 See supra Part LB.1. 
m Romney II, 456 F.2d at 818. 
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enforce it in court, was greater than even Arnstein acknowl-
edged. The potential power of enforced consultation is that it 
implicitly necessitates a form of disclosure by the government 
entity administering the program. By virtue of this disclosure, 
if citizen groups are organized, they can respond and challenge 
decisions with which they do not agree or that appear disad-
vantageous. Therefore, the court of appeals' decision in Romney 
accorded a potentially significant power to AWC when it pro-
vided legal recourse for the city's failure to comply with the 
Model Cities participatory mandate. -But, by focusing only on 
the issue of AWC's exclusion, the court missed the essence of 
the underlying dispute. The real dispute was about the nature 
of AWC's participation: what constituted meaningful participa-
tion in the context of the Model Cities program. The OEO and 
HUD, in effect, interpreted meaningful participation to include 
planning and consulting. One can infer that this meant that 
citizens should have a role in setting the agenda, and perhaps 
being consulted on the fine tuning of the agenda. By contrast, 
AWC viewed participation as absolutely and necessarily involv-
ing the management of program operations. Why? Probably for 
the very practical reason that AWC wanted to bring to fruition 
what it had worked to conceive. Control of the operations 
meant true self-reliance and empowerment-employment in a 
project ostensibly designed to improve conditions in the neigh-
borhood. This was a profitable enterprise and AWC disagreed 
that they should be excluded from the benefits of supervision 
and control of the operations. This underlying dimension of the 
participatory dispute in Romney supports Arnstein's argument 
that participation necessarily entails a redistribution of power. 
While HUD's categorical exclusion of citizen participatory units 
from program operations was based on fears of corruption or 
self-dealing, the manner in which it chose to handle this com-
mon corporate conflict-of-interest problem242 suggests that an 
implicit goal of the directive was also to limit political disrup-
tions at the local level by having citizen participation lead to 
redistribution of power to AWC. 
242 The need to plan for conflicts of interests is an acknowledged issue in the 
organization and operation of closely held corporations. See, e.g., Harry J. 
Haynsworth, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About Drafting Documents for 
Closely-Held Corporations: Special Problems of Closely-Held Corporations, Ql71 
ALI-ABA 5, 8 (1988). 
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4. The Intractability of Conflicting Interests 
In some ways, empowerment or political control theory is 
the most promising and satisfying theory because it is based 
on specific social groups and pragmatically takes into account 
the obstacles ordinary black people and communities face. It is 
liberatory in its aspirations, as well as unabashed in its em-
brace of political competition. Admittedly, it suffers from some 
of the same difficulties as the other justifications. In particu-
lar, it fails to provide a way to deal with conflicting interests 
within communities. For example, the participants in a com-
munity participation process are usually the elites of the com-
munity. Questions remain about whether their interests are 
always consistent with the very poor, who are either alienated 
or busy trying to survive and thus rarely participate in com-
munity decision-making.243 
Yet political control and citizen power, while not literally 
practicable or desirable, are still conceptually important for the 
explicit recognition they give to the conflict of interests in the 
city in general and the development process in particular. As 
Castells has argued, "Cities contain two kinds of relationships 
that are ultimately antagonistically interdependent: those of 
production and economic accumulation and those of social 
interaction and community formation. The tension between 
them deeply permeates urban institutions, urban form and 
urban life."m Therefore, participation in a development pro-
cess can never be seen as merely discourse for discourse's sake. 
Nor can we assume that bargaining and exchange will protect 
all interests. Instead, meaningful participation (i.e., having a 
decisive voice in favor of issues that may go against the pre-
vailing value placed on economic development) is ultimately 
participation that is really an act of resistance. It seeks to 
bring a voice not to tinker with the process, but to redirect its 
emphasis away from uses and developments that gentrify cen-
trally located neighborhoods, displacing poorer residents or 
channeling the resources of the city exclusively to the down-
243 But see Eleanor M. Novek, Communication and Community Empowerment, 
11 PEACE REv. 61, 67 (1999) (discussing communication strategies used by a 
grassroots leadership group in building community). 
2« Janice K Tulloss, Citizen Participation in Boston's Deuelopment Policy; The 
Political Economy of Participation, 30 URB. AFF. REv. 514, 514·37 (Mar. 1995). 
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town business district to the detriment of neighborhoods that 
could also benefit from the infusion of their fair share of re-
sources. 
CONCLUSION 
Experiences with community participation have been dis-
satisfying for three broad reasons. First, the mandate is largely 
undefined, drawing upon vaguely defined and often conflicting 
rhetoric based on notions of pragmatic utilitarianism, individu-
al self-transformation, or political control of development in 
poor, often black, neighborhoods. As a result, commuItities are 
given no real power to affect the outcome of development pro-
cesses. Second, no real consensus on the purposes of develop-
ment exists. Because community participation involves direct 
democratic decision-making, we, as a society, are at best am-
bivalent about such participation-torn between our desire for 
customer service and efficiency on the one hand, and vaguely 
but strongly held egalitarian notions of the right to express 
one's opinion on the other hand. Lastly, the mandates usually 
fail to contain any mechanism for enforcement of participatory 
requirements. Because participation is designed to include 
ordinary people in an area of public decision-making-urban 
economic development-that is privatized, expert-driven, and 
elite-dominated, failure to provide a means of enforcement for 
ordinary citizens means a community participation require-
ment can be rendered meaningless. As the foregoing discussion 
has shown, however, meaningful or effective participation of 
poor inner-city residents in the development process can only 
take place when participation is properly understood not only 
as a form of participatory inclusion, but also as a struggle for 
redistribution of power. 245 
At the beginning of this Article, I noted community 
participation's radical underlying premise that ordinary people 
are to be included in a legally technical and logistically compli-
cated process, even if they are uneducated, untrained, and 
poor. People who are of different classes, races, education lev-
els, professional status, and socioeconomic backgrounds are 
2<S See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS 
OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1987). 
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supposed to work together in an open decision-making process. 
People who are interested in a neighborhood for the profit to 
be made are supposed to work together with people who are 
only concerned about the quality of life in the neighborhood. 
Because there are competing interests that are often irreconcil-
able,24s a participation scheme requires justifications that ex-
tend beyond mere instrumental justifications of efficiency or 
democratic justifications of the possible self-development bene-
fits of process. The benefits to self, the understanding of oth-
ers, and the benefit to local government administration come 
not from the process of negotiation, but from allowing for a 
real opportunity to affect the outcome of that negotiation. Add-
ing democratic decision-making principles to the otherwise 
privatized and elite-driven sphere of economic development 
requires a fundamental commitment to the idea that inclusion 
of the community could reorder or change the development 
agenda. Therefore, a meaningful scheme of participation will 
necessarily be based on a commitment to some amount of re-
distribution of decision-making power. 
Accordingly, a meaningful participatory scheme or plan 
requires three basic things. First, the community must be 
included early within a decision-making process, in fact at the 
agenda-setting stage of the process. This necessarily raises the 
question of whether the goals of economic development are up 
for discussion. We must be willing to allow community partici-
pants to broaden the definition of economic development be-
yond business incentives and job training to include other 
human needs and services as defined by the community. Sec-
ond, any meaningful community participation scheme should 
include an enforcement mechanism, either in a set of sanctions 
for failure to provide for meaningful citizen participation or, at 
the very least, a guarantee that some level of an ability to 
affect the outcome of a decision-making process is provided. 
2<6 See HALPERN, supra note 31, at 90 (describing the leading proponents of the 
Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Program's tendency to "believe[] that different 
groups in society ultimately had the same interests but were frustrated by not 
knowing how to combine their energies in a constructive process"); see also MONA 
HARRINGTON, THE DREAM OF DELIVERANCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1986) (explor-
ing in depth "the tendency to deny the reality of fundamental differences in inter-
ests among social classes, economic, and related groups, and the ways in which 
that tendency constrains problem solving."). 
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Third, a meaningful citizen participation scheme should allow 
citizens sufficient time to get used to all of the competing in-
terests at stake in a city, which in the economic development 
context, with its sense of inevitability and constant promise of 
jobs, may not always be readily apparent. One approach proba-
bly should be to institutionalize citizen participation mecha-
nisms permanently in the form of sub-local or community-
based decision-making bodies. Local governments should not 
wait for a development project to attempt to belatedly throw 
together participatory institutions. The exclusionary forces and 
power of dominant interests in the "growth coalition" are too 
forceful to wait to attempt to redistribute decision-making 
power away from these actors. This may require, however, that 
local governments begin to contemplate delegating decision-
making power on real and substantive decisions to allow com-
munity participation and education in the business of commu-
nity decision-making on real decisions regularly.247 
Of course, these recommendations in some ways are direct-
ed at the easy question: Why is participation important? The 
harder question of how to implement participatory schemes re-
mains unanswered. But at the very least, we cannot answer 
the harder questions without at least addressing the relatively 
easy ones that this Article has focused on. The answer to the 
hard questions will necessarily be determined by the circum-
stances and context of particular places.24s 
2,7 Box, supra note 127, at 16 (advocating that public administrators have an 
obligation to give away knowledge and decision-making power for policy choices to 
better reflect citizen desires). 
248 See generally Robert Chaskin & Sunil Garg, The Issue of Governance in 
Neighborhood-Based Initiatives, 32 URB. AFF. REv. 631 (1997) (discussing the diffi-
culties and unanswered questions of how to structure community-based participato-
ry initiatives); Joel D. Wolfe, A Defense of Participatory Democracy, 47 REv. OF 
POLITICS 370 (July 1985) (discussing the problems of participation and popular 
control in large-member voluntary organizations). 
